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It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognized as citizens
in any one State of the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever
they pleased, ... and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public
and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to
hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms

wherever they went.1

INTRODUCTION

The often strident debate over the Second Amendment2 is like few others
in American constitutional discourse and historiography.

It is a constitu

tional debate that has taken place largely in the absence of Supreme Court
opinion.3 It is a historical controversy where the framers' intentions have
1. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 4.17 (1857) (emphasis added).
2. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
3. The Supreme Court has directly ruled on Second Amendment claims in only four cases.

See

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Presser v. Illi
nois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). Proponents of the
collective rights theory have frequently cited these cases as supportive of their views. It is more
accurate to describe the first three

cases

as having recognized the individual right, but also

as

having

construed the Second Amendment as a bar to federal, but not state or private, infringement of the
right.

See infra

Part

III. United States v. Miller limited the Second Amendment's protection to
See infra Part IV. Since then, a number of lower federal courts

weapons useful for militia duty.

have heard Second Amendment claims, often dismissing them on grounds that the Amendment has
not been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, which would make it binding on the states.
Other courts have dismissed the claims by employing the collective rights theory. Almost all of
these

cases

involved persons involved in criminal activity who were also convicted of firearms

charges and thus are not really a good test of the extent to which the Second Amendment protects
the rights of the public at large.

See, e.g.,

United States v. Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever

Action Carbines, 504 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974) (statute prohibiting possession offirearms by previ
ously convicted felon does not infringe upon Second Amendment).

In a recent case in which a

federal court sustained a general prohibition against handgun ownership, the Supreme Court re
fused to consider the case on appeal.
1982),

cert. denied, 464

See Quilici

v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir.

U.S. 863 (1983).

If the federal jurisprudence concerning the Second Amendment is somewhat thin, it should be
noted that there is extensive case law concerning analogous provisions in state bills of rights. In
deed it is likely, should the Supreme Court ever seriously consider the question, that it might bor
row Second Amendment doctrine from the state courts. For some recent constructions of state
right to keep and bear arms provisions

see,

e.g., Hoskins v. State, 449 So.2d 1269 (Ala. Crim. App.

1984) (statute prohibiting a person convicted of committing a crime of violence from owning or
possessing a pistol does not deny right to keep and bear arms); Rabbitt v. Leonard, 413 A.2d 489
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) (statute permitting revocation of pistol permit for cause and providing
notice of revocation and opportunity for de novo postrevocation hearing does not violate citizen's
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best been gleaned from indirect rather than direct evidence.4 It is a scholarly
debate that members of the academy have been until recently somewhat re
luctant to join, 5 leaving the field to independent scholars primarily concerned
with the modem gun control controversy. 6 In short, the Second Amendment
right to bear anns); State v. Friel, 508 A.2d 12 3 (Me . 1986) (statue prohibiting possession of a

keep and bear arms); People v.
Ct. App. 1989) (statute prohibiting possession of stun guns docs
not impermissibly infringe upon right to keep and bear arms); State v. Vlacil, 645 P . 2d 677 (Utah
firearm by a convicted felon does not violate constitutional right to

Smelter, 437 N.W.2d 341 (Mich.

1982) (statute making it a Class A misdemeanor for any noncitizen to own or

possess a dangerous

weapon is not unconstitutional). For a historical discussion of state right to

keep and

bear arms

provisions, see generally STEPHEN P. H ALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL
BILLS OF RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES (1989).

4. The debates in the House of Representatives over what became the Second Amendment (it

was originally proposed as the Fourth Amendm ent) centered on a clause excepting conscientious
objectors from militia duty. The original text of the Amendment read: "A well regulated militia.

state, the right of the people to
scrupulous shall be compelled
210 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lern er eds.,

composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free

keep and bear arms shall not. be infringed; but no person religiously
to bear arms." THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION

1987). The House debate, f o cusing on the religious ex emption, sheds little light on the individual

versus collective rights debate, although the phrase "body of the people"

used to describe the militia

does suggest the idea of a militia of the whole. Still, the best evidence of the framen' intentions in
this matter comes from the surrounding history and the comments of the constitutional framers
generally with respect to t h e composition of the militia. See infra Part I.
5. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 639-42

(1989) (discussing the reluctance of most constitutional scholars to treat the Second Amendment as
a subject worthy of serious scholarly or pedagogical consideration). Recently, however, one scholar
has examined the Second Amendment within the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole. See Akhil
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991). In

Amar s view, the Bill of
designed to protec t
'

Rights was designed with both populist and collective concerns in mind. It was

both the right of the people and to prevent potential tyranny from an overreaching federal govern

ment. Amar sees the purpose of the Second Amendment as preventing Congress from disarming
freem en, so that the populace could resist tyranny imposed by a standing army. Id. at 1162-73.
6. See, e.g., David I. C aplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited. 5 FORD
URe. L.J. 31 (1976) (current efforts to limit firearm possession undermine the Second Amend

HAM

ment's twin goals of individual and collective defense); Robert Dowlut, Federal and State
Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L. R EV. 59 (1989) (laws seeking to disarm the
pe ople violate the Second Amendment); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution

or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65 (1983) (interpretation of the Second
Amendm ent is controlled by the framers' intent to guarantee the individual right to keep and bear
.
arms rather than a more narrow judicial interpretation); Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis
A. Hemgan,

The Second Amendment i n the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia lately?. 15 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 5 (1989) (Second Amendment's historical origins erect no real barrier to federal
or state law
s affecting handguns); Richard E. Gardiner, To Preserve Liberty-A Look at the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 63 (1982) (advocates of gun control have twisted the

<Jw_

nership: A. Con
original and plain meaning of the Second Amendment); Alan M. Gottlieb, Gun
stitutional Right, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 113 (1982) (modem antipathy to fi rearms has mftuenced inter
pre tation of the Second A mendment as a collective right); David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment
and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & PoL. l (1987) (the Second Am� dment has a
du al purpose stemming from the merger of the militia and the right to bear arms prov1s1ons); May
. 8 N.C. CENT. L.J.
nard H. Jackson, Jr.,
Handgun Control: Constitutional and Critically Needed .
of g un cont rol);
ments
189 ( 1977) (Second
l
ega
l
the
of
on
discussi
any
Amendment is central to
.
Ne lson Lund, The Second Amend ment, Political Liberty and the Right to Self-Preserwwon. 39 ALA.
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is an arena of constitutional jurisprudence that still awaits its philosopher.
The debate over the Second Amendment is ultimately part of the larger
debate over gun control, a debate about the extent to which the Amendment

was either meant to be or should be interpreted as limiting the ability of
government to prohibit or limit private ownership of firearms. Waged in the
popular press, 7 in the halls of Congress, 8 and increasingly in historical and
L. REV. 103 (1987) (suggesting a Second Amendmen t jurisprudence consistent with modern treat

ment of the Bill of Rights such that handgun regulation be reasonably tailored to public safety);
James A. McClure, Firearms and Federalism, 7 IDAHO L. REV. 197 (1970) (Second Amendment
precludes federal interference but leaves to debate the issue of state regulation of handguns); Robert
J. Riley, Shooting to Kill the Handgun: Time to Martyr Another American ''Hero," 51 J. URB. L.
491 (1974) (construing the Second Amendment as a surpassable barrier to handgun control by
finding the handgun a weapon of marginal military utility); Jonathan A. Weiss, A R eply to A dvo
cates of Gun Control Law. 52 J. URB. L. 577 (1974) (placing the Second Amendment in context of
the Bill of Rights, provides an inviolable right to bear arms and an absolute bar to government
restriction).
Two advocates of the individual rights theory who are outside the academy, but have nonetheless
been quite instrumental in influencing the constitutional debate among law teachers and historians,
are Donald B. Kates, Jr. and Stephen P. Halbrook. See, e.g. Donald B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohi
bition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH . L. R E V . 204 (1983) (Second
Amendment right to bear arms, applicable against both federal and state government, does not
foreclose, but limits, gun control options); Donald B. Kates, Jr., The Second A mendment: A Dia
logue, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 143 (1986) (Second Amendment substantially limits the arbi
trariness of granting gun permits); Steven. P. Halbrook, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE
EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIG HT (1984) [hereinafter HALBROOK, THAT E V ER Y MAN BE
ARMED] (the right of citizens to keep and bear arms has deep historical roots and overly restrictive
interpretations of the Second Amendment are associated with reactionary concepts including elit
ism, militarism, and racism); Steven P. Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the Secon d and Fourteenth
Amendments, 4 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 1 (1981) (the fundamental character of the Second
Amendment and the increasingly restrictive forms of gun control legislation necessitate Suprem e
Court precedent on the status of the Amendment's applicability to the states); Stephen P. Halbrook,
What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to "Bear Arms," 49 LAw & CoN 
TEMP. PRoes. 151 (1986) (Second Amendment right to bear arms is incompatible with the sugges
tion of no right to bear arms without state or federal permission).
7. See, e.g . Daniel Abrams, What 'Right to Bear Arms'?, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1989, at A23;
Robe rt J. Cottrol, It's Time to Enforce the Second Amendment, PLAI N DEALER (Cleveland), Feb.
17, 1990, at 5B; Ervin N. Griswold, Phantom Second Amendment Rights, WASH. PosT, Nov. 4,
1990, at C7; Sue Wimmershotf-Caplan, The Founde r s and the AK-47, WASH. POST, July 6, 1989, at
A 18. Even former Chief Justice Warren Burger has used this arena to opine o n the subject. See
Warren Burger, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, PARADE MAG., Jan. 14, 1 990, at 4.
For one int eresti n g example of a writer who (reluctantly ) supports the individual rights interpre
tation of the Second Amendme nt and who, as a member of the gun
control group Handgun Con
trol, Inc., is also a strong advocate of stricter gun control, see
columnist Michael Kinsley, Slicing
Up th� Second Amendment. WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1990, at
A25. More recently, conservative colum
nist George Will, also an advocate of stricter gun control,
has stated that "The National Rifle
Assoc1att on .1s perhaps correct and certainly plausible in its 'strong' reading of the Second A mend
.
ment protection for pnvate
gun ownership." Will argues for repeal of the Second Amen dment on
.
the grounds that the nght 1s
�ot as important as it was 200 years ago.
.
Will also makes the mterest
mg observation that "The subject of gun control reveals a role rever
sal between liberals an d c nservatives that makes
both sides seem tendentious. Liberals who usu
?
_ ut1ona
ally argue that const1t
� rights (of criminal defendants, for example) must be respected
regardless of mconvemcnt social consequences say
· h t 1s t oo costly
that the second A mend ment ng
.

.

•

·
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legal journals,9 two dominant interpretations have emerged. Advocates of
stricter gun controls have tended t o stress the Amendment's Militia Clause,

arguing that the purpose of the Amendment was to ensure that state militias
would be maintained against potential federal encroachment. This argu
ment, embodying the collective rights theory, sees the framers' primary, in
deed sole, concern as one with the concentration of military power in the
hands of the federal government, and the corresponding need to ensure a
decentralized military establishment largely under state control. to

Opponents of stricter gun controls have tended to stress the Amendment's
second clause, arguing that the framers intended a militia of the whol�r at
least the entire able-bodied white male-population, expected to perform its
duties with privately owned weapons.11

Advocates of this view also fre

quently urge that the Militia Clause should be read as an amplifying, rather
than a qualifying, clause. They argue that, while maintaining a "well-regu
lated militia"12 was the predominate reason for including the Second
Amendment in the Bill of Rights, it should not be viewed as the sole or

to honor. Conservatives who frequently favor applying cost-benefit analysis to constitutional con
struction (of defendants' rights, for example) advocate an absolutist construction of the Second
Amendment." See George Will, Oh That Annoying Second Amendment: It Shows No Signs of
Going Away, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, March 22, 1991.

Alth ou gh the Second Amendment and gun control debates involve far more than a simple lib
eral/conservative dichotomy, there are n umerous exceptions on both sides; Will's poin t is well
taken. If we accept the conventional view that the National Rifte Association is a predominantly
conservative organization and that advocates of gun control tend to be politically liberal, we can see
rather interesting role reversals. For example, the NRA has attacked firearms bans in public hous
ing, bans which mainly affect people who are poor and black, while liberal groups have generally
remained silent on the issue.
8. See THE RIGH T TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITU
TION OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, s. REP No. 522, 97t h Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982) [hereinaf
ter SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT).
9. See id. ; see also Lawrence Delbert Cress & Robert E. Stalhope, The Second Amendment and
the Right to Bear Arms: An Exchange, 71 J. A M HIST. 587 (1984) (debate whether correct interpre
.

tation of Second Amendment rests on rights to bear arms or communal prerogatives implied in
Militia Clause); Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear A rms: The Commo n
Law Tr adition, 1 0 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285 (1983), reprinted i n FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE:
ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 391-95 (Donald B. Kates, Jr. ed. 1984) (proper reading of Second
Amendment extends to every citizen right to bear arms for personal defense); Robert E. .s�alhope,
The Ideo logical Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599 ( 1982) (armed citizen and
.
militia existed as distinct, yet interrelated, elements within American republican thought)
10. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 6, at 194 (the purpose of the Second Amendment was to main
tain the militia, not to provide an individua l right to bear arms); Roy G. Weatherup, Standing
Amendm ent, 2 HASTIN GS CON ST L'.Q. 961.
Ar
mies and Armed Citizens: An A nalysis of the Second

.

963 995 1000 (1975) (Second Amendment was designed solely to protect the states ag�mst the
,
,
f�deral government, using a historical analysi s of the relationship between citizens and their sover
eign as evidence).
Handgun
11. See, e. g., Halbro ok, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, supra note 6, at 55-87; Kates,
6, at 214-18, 273.
Prohibition
g of the Second A mendment, supra note

12. U.S.

and the Original Meanin

CONST. amend. II.
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limiting reason. They argue that the framers also contemplated a right to
individual and community protection.13 This view embodies the individual
rights theory.
This debate has raised often profound questions, but questions generally
treated hastily, if at all, by the community of constitutional scholars. 1 4 For
example, if one accepts the collective rights view o f the Amendment, serious
questions arise concerning whether the federal government's integration of
the National Guard into the Army and, later, the Air Force have not in all
but name destroyed the very institutional independence of the militia that is
at the heart of what the collective rights theorists see as the framers' inten
tions. 1 5 Even the gun control debate is not completely resolved by an accept
ance of the collective rights theory. If the Second Amendment was desig ned
to ensure the existence of somewhat independen t state militias immune from
federal encroachment, then the question arises to what extent states are free
to define militia membership. Could a state include as members of its militia
all adult citizens, thus permitting them an exemption from federal firearms
restrictions? If, instead, the federal government has plenary power to define
militia membership and chooses to confine such membership to the federally
controlled National Guard, does the Second Amendment become a dead let
ter under the collective rights theory?
If the collective rights theory raises difficult questions, the individual rights
theory raises perhaps even more difficult, and perhaps more interesting ones.

Some of these questions are obvious and frequently asked, such as where to
draw the line between an individual's right to possess arms and the corollary
right to self-defense on the one hand, and the community's interest i n public
safety and crime control on the other. Other questions are more elusive,

more difficult to pose as well as to answer. At the heart of the individual
rights view is the contention that the framers of the Second Amendment
intended to protect the right to bear arms for two related purposes. The first

o� these was to ensure popular participation in the security of the commu
m � �· an outgrowth of the English and early Americ
an reliance on posses and

_
m1ht1as made up of the general citizenry to provide police and military
forces.16 The second purpose was to ensure an armed
citizenry in order to
prevent potential tyranny by a government empowered
and perhap s embold
ened by a monopoly of force. t 1
1 J. Sa. <'-X · Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original
·
Meaning of the Second Amendment,

Jupru note 6.

14. Set' .fupra note 5.
15. See Perpich v. Department of Defense, 110
S. Ct. 2418, 2422-26 (1990) (discussing the history of leg1slat10n gov er n i ng the m1ht1a and the National
Guard , an d Congress s plenary au th on·t Y
.
1wcr the National Guard).
•

16. See Malcolm. Jupra note 9. at 290-95.
17. See Ste phen Halbrook's exploration of that idea within
the context of c1ass ·tca 1 po i·1t1ca
.
· l ph1-
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The second argument, that an armed populace might serve as a basis for
resistance to tyranny, raises questions of its own. The framers had firsthand
experience with such a phenomenon, but they lived in an age when the
weapon likely to be found in private hands, the single shot musket or pistol,
did not differ considerably from its military counterpart. Although the ar

mies of the day possessed heavier weapons rarely found in private hands,
battles were fought predominately by infantry or cavalry with weapons not
considerably different from those employed by private citizens for personal
protection or hunting.18

Battles in which privately armed citizens van
quished regular troops, or at least gave "a good account of themselves," were
not only conceivable-they happened.19
Modem warfare has, of course, introduced an array of weapons that no
government is likely to permit ownership by the public at large2° and that
few advocates of the individual rights view would claim as part of the public
domain.21 The balance of power has shifted considerably and largely to the
side of governments and their standing armies. For i ndividual rights theo
rists, this shift immediately raises the question of whether, given the tremen
dous changes that have occurred in weapons technology, the framers'
presumed intention of enabling the population to resist tyranny remains via
ble in the modem world. 22 Although partly a question of military tactics,
losophy in THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, supra note 6, at 7-35; see also Gardiner, supra note 6, at

73-82 (the history of the Second Amendment indicates that one of its purposes was to ensure the
existence of a n armed citizenry as a defense against domestic tyranny); Lund, supra note 6, at 11116 (Second Amendment protects an individual's right to bear arms in order to secure his political

freedo m); Shalhope, supra note 9, at 610-13 (framers of the Second Amendment, motivated by their
distru st of g overnment, intended to protect the right of individuals to bear arms).
18. The American civilian of the mid-18th century was typically armed with the "Pennsylvania"
rifle, later to be known as the "Kentucky" rifle. See Daniel Boorstin's discussion of the relative

mer its of the Pennsylvania Rifte and the muskets that British soldiers were equipped with in
DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 350-51 (1958).
19. For o n e account of the battles of Lexington and Concord, see DAVID HAWKE, THE COLO
NIAL EXPERIE NCE 573-78 (1966).

20. It shoul d not be necessary to detail such obvious examples as stinger issiles and nu�lear
�
weapons, but even more ordinary military weapons are also unlikely to be permitted to the pubhc at
lar ge. For example, the U.S. Anny expects every soldier, regardless of military special y, to be
�
proficient with the
M203 grenade launcher (a shoulder-fired light mortar capable of firing a 40
millimeter high explosive round 400 meters), the M72A2 light antitank weapon (LAW) (a hand
hel d disposable antitank weapon capable o f penetrating an armored vehicle at 300 meters), the M67
fragmentatio n grenade, and the Ml8AI Claymore antipersonnel mine. See DEPARTMENT OF THE
ARM Y, SOLDI ER'S MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS: SKILL LEVEL l (1985).
21. For o n e of the better efforts to reconcile modern weaponry with the type of weapons the
framers inten d e d to protect, see Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, supra note
6, at 204, 261.
.
22. W e are putting aside for the moment the question of the utihty ?r po� ent�al uttl� ty of an
.
armed population
m mamtammg either na
as a useful auxiliary to national or local governments
World War, when the
tional or com
munity security. It should be noted that during the Second
Nati onal Guar d had been mobilized into the Army, impromptu home defense forces-some organ
ized by state
areas and likely sabotage
governments, some privatel y organized-patrolled beach
.

.

.

.
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and thus beyond the scope of this discussion,23 it is also a constitutional quessights. The individuals who performed this service were usually equip�d

�ith their

own w �a �ns.

And while this American version of "Dad's Army" encountered no s1gmficant enemy activ1ty
doubtless to the relief of all concerned, particularly the participants-the utility of these patrols
should be noted. If such patrols were necessary, and some undoubtedly were, from the military
point of view, it was probably better to have civilian auxiliaries performing this function, freeing
regular military units for more pressing duties. See id. at 272 n .284

.

It should also be noted that,

immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian territorial governor ordered citizens to
report with their own firearms for defense of the Islands in anticipation of Japanese invasion. Ironi
cally, given the later treatment of Japanese Americans on the m ainland, a good percentage of the
men who made up the citizens' home guard in Hawaii were of Japanese descent. See id.
In light of our later discussion of whether or not, given the racial restriction in the Uniform
Militia Act of 1792, free Negroes were considered part of the militia, see infra Part I.c.2, it should
be noted that many of the individuals who served in these home guard organizations probably did
not meet the statutory definition of militia members. By statute, m embership in the militia is de
fined

as

men from 18-45. Most men in that age group were in the armed forces during the Second

World War

so

that those performing home guard duties were probably older and younger than the

statutory age limits. See Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning o f the Second

Amendment, supra note 6, at 272 n. 284 (research indicates that m e n between the ages of 16 and 65
served in home guard units). It is also probable that a fair number of women performed those tasks.
For our purposes, what is interesting about this history is that it indicates that militia membership
i ition. Perhaps the best way o f viewing the issue is to regard
is even broader than the statutory defn
statutory militia provisions as defining those who may be compelled to perform militia service, but
to realize that the whole population might be permitted to volunteer for militia service.
23. Despite modem technological advances, the impotence o f privately-armed civilians against
organized armies is by no means obvious. Afghan guerrillas, to cite a recent example, were quite
successful in resisting the Soviet Army largely with small arms.
Colonel and Professor at the Army

War College, indicated in a

Harry Summers, retired Army

recent column that he believed an

armed population could resist a tyrannical government or at least d o so better than an unarmed
one.

See Harry Summers, Gun Collecting and Lithuania, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1990, at F4

(public should protect its right to bear arms as a protection against government).
There arc at least three ways to approach the question of an armed population resisting the
government. The first is to look at what happens when actual armed conflict breaks out between a
nation's military forces and the population or a segment of the population. Although modem tech
nology weights the odds heavily in the government's favor, other considerations, including whether

not military forces arc overextended, the skill of the population in general with arms (which
might be inftucnccd by the number of military veterans in the population or the number of people
who regularly practice with firearms), the terrain, and the morale of military forces called upon to

or

suppress the population, might tend to redress the technological imbalance
.
The second way of viewing this question is to look at it as a question of deterrence. From this
.
perspective, one might argue that, even if a government would ultimately win a confrontation with
an armed population, the cost to the government
is higher. It will endure substantially larger casu
_
alties
and may have to endure large scale destruction of economic
ally valuable infrastructure in
order to achieve its objectives. This higher cost might cause
a government to seek compromise, or
cause a reluctance on the part of many in the military
to participate, even if ultimate victory was
a ssured
In the Sov1e1 Union, press reports indicated great resistanc
e on the part of citizens to
�n dm g
cscrvists to the Azerbaijan region, in part because the populati
on was armed and willing to
5t•e Bill Keller' orbachev ls.rues Emergency ecree Over
Azerbaijan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
.
1 90. a t A I (Azerba11am leader threaten s armed
resistance against military); Bill Keller, Moscow
Di.�pou:hes 11.000 Troops to Azerbaij n. N. Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 1990, at Al (Gorbachev hes itated in
�
sending troops partly from fear of wide-scale popular
resistance); Bill Keller, Troops Seek to Calm
Aurbal}_an: Soviets Dtbare Cause of Violence,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1990 at Al (one reason for
hesitation before send ing troops was fear of popular
disapproval of send ng troops to dangerous
.

r�ist.

�

�

f!
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If private ownership o f firearms is constitutionally protected, should

this right be protected with the original military and political purposes in
mind, or should the protection of firearms now be viewed as protecting only
those weapons used for personal protection or recreation?24 Or, given that
all firearms are potentially multi-purpose, and that all firearms potentially
may be used for military, recreational, or personal defense as well as for
criminal purposes, what effect should legislatures and courts give to the
framers' original military rationale? Where should the proper lines be drawn
with respect to modern firearms, all of which employ technologies largely
unimag i ned by the framers?25
Societal, as well as technological, changes raise questions for advocates of
the individual rights view of the Second Amendment. In the eighteenth cen
tury, the chief vehicle for law enforcement was the posse

comitatus,

and the

major American military force was the militia of the whole. While these
institutions are still recognized by modem law,26 they lie dormant in late
twentieth-century America. Professional police forces and a standing miliarea); Esther B. Fein, Gorbachev is Backed on Azerbaijan Combat,

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1990, at A8

(Gorbachev criticized in the past for sending troops to control civil unrest); Bill Keller, Soviet

Troops Bogged Down by Azerbaijanis Blockades of Railroads and Airfields,

N.Y.

TIMES, Jan. 19,

1990, at Al (many young Soviets not eager to be mobilized); Frances X. Clines, Soviet Force Said to

Battle With Azerbaijani Militants: Call

Up of Reserves Halted, N.Y.

TIMES, Jan. 20, 1990, at A l

(Moscow e n d s mobilization of reservists after wide protests); Bill Keller, Cry of Won't Give Up My

Son! And Soviets End the Call-Up,

N.Y.

TIMES, Jan. 20, 1990, at

A6

(same).

The third consideration is the one most relevant to the Afro-American experience. Governmen
tal oppression can occur when the state actively oppresses the population or a segment of the popu
lation. It c a n also occur when the state displays an active indifference to the denial of one segment
of the population's rights by another. This occurred most vividly for blacks during the Jim Crow
era. See infra Part IV.
24. The latter appears to be the view taken by former Chief Justice Burger. See Burger, supra
note 7, at 4.
25. In the 18th century, when the Second Amendment was adopted, firearms were single shot
devices that were reloaded very slowly. Firearms were loaded by pouring black gunpowder down
the mu zzle of the firearm, followed by a separate bullet (usually a lead ball); the load was then

rammed down with a ramrod. By way of contrast, modem firearms are usually loaded with self

contained cartridges-cartridges where the bullet and the powder are contained in one single cap
sule. Almost all modem firearms, with the exception of a few firearms designed almost exclusively
for target shooting or training children in the use of firearms, are repeaters: they can fire more than
one bullet before the shooter has to reload. Among the types of repeating firearms that exist today
are revolvers (pistols with between five and nine rotating cylinders), manually operated rifles and
shotguns, firearms that require the operation of a lever or bolt between pulls of the trigger in order
to make a n e w round of ammunition ready to fire, semiautomatic firearms (pistols, rifles, and shot
guns capable of firing a new round with each pull of the trigger), and automatic firearms (weapons
that will fire a new round as long as the shooter depresses the trigger).

These new developments

make all modern firearms much more rapid fire than those employed in the 18th century.

For

books that illustrate the history of firearms technology, see ROBERT HELD, THE AGE OF FIRE·
ARMS, A PICTORIAL HISTORY (1957); BASIL P. HUGHES, FIREPOWER: WEAPONS EFFECTIVENESS
ON THE BATTLE F I ELD, 1630-1850 (1975); HAROLD L. PETERSON, THE TREASURY OF THE GUN

( 1962).

26. See, e.g. 10 U.S.C. § 3l l (1988) (unorganized militia consists of all men between the ages of
.
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tary establishment assisted by semi-professional auxiliaries-the reserves and
the National Guard-have largely assumed the roles of public protection and
national security. It is possible that the concept of a militia of the armed
citizenry has been largely mooted by social change.
Yet, the effect of social change on the question of the Second Amendment
is a two-edged sword. If one of the motivating p urposes behind the Second
Amendment was to provide a popular check against potential governmental
excess, then does the professionalization of national and community security
make the right to keep and bear arms even more important in the modern
context? Furthermore, the q uestion remains whether the concept of a militia
of the whole is worth re-examining: Did the framers, by adopting the Second
Amendment, embrace a republican vision of the rights and responsibilities of
free citizens that, despite the difficulties, should somehow be made to work
today?
Finally, the Second Amendment debate raises important questions con
cerning constitutional interpretation, questions that need to be more fully
addressed by legal historians and constitutional commentators. It poses im
portant questions about notions of the living Constitution, and to what ex
tent that doctrine can be used to limit as well as extend rights. It also poses
important questions about social stratification, cultural bias, and constitu
tional interpretation. Do courts really protect rights explicit or implicit in
the Constitution, or is the courts' interpretation of rights largely a dialogue
with the elite, articulate sectors of society, with the courts enforcing those
rights favored by dominant elites and ignoring those not so favored?
Many of the issues surrounding the Second Amendment debate are raised
in particularly sharp relief from the perspective of African-American history.
With the exception of Native Americans, no people in American history have
been more influenced by violence than blacks. Private and public violence
main tained slavery.27 The nation's most destructive conflict ended the "pe
culiar institution. "2" That all too brief experiment in racial egalitarianism,
Reconstruction, was ended by private violence29 and abetted by Supreme
Court sanction.'0 Jim Crow was sustained by private violence, often with
1 ll and 45. and fcmalCli who are com � issioned National Guard officers); Williams
v. State, 490
S. W. 2 d . 1 1 7, 1 2 1 (Arie I 973) (recognm ng the continued validity of the posse comitatus power).
27 . .') c•c K EN N ETH M. STAMPP, THE PECUUA R INSTITUTION : SLAVER
Y IN THE ANTEBELLUM
Sou rn 1 4 1 -9 1 ( I 956).

The Civil War CO<;I lhe Union and Confederate armies a combined
casualty total of 498 3 3 2
,
By w a y o f contrast. World W a r I I , t h e nation's second bloodie
st conflict, cost t h e United
Slates 407 . .' 1 6 fat a lit ies. See Tur WoRLn ALMANA C & Boo K OF FACTS
793 (Mark S. Hoffman
ed . . l 'N I )
2ll.

deaths .

29. St'•' !i•'ncra//y ERK FON ER, R H.ONSTRUCTION: AMERI CA'S UNFIN
ISHED REVOLUTIO N ,
l llti J - 1 8 7 7 . a t �M-bCX) ( I Q88): GEORG E c RABl.E , BUT THERE WAS
No PEACE: THE R O L E OF
V 1 < > 1 !'. � C T 1:-.- nu 1'01 nrcs Of· R ECONSTRUCTI ON ( 1 984).
JO. s,.,., <'.I(.. Li m l cd State<;

\

·

Harris. 106 U .S. 629 ( 1 882) (holdi
ng unconstitutional a federal
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public assistance. 3 1
If today the memories of past interracial violence are beginning to fade,
they are being quickly replaced by the frightening phenomenon of black-on
black violence, making life all too precarious for poor blacks in inner city
neighborhoods. 32 Questions raised by the Second Amendment, particularly
those concerning self-defense, crime, participation in the security of the com
munity, and the wisdom or utility of relying exclusively on the state for pro
tection, thus take on a peculiar urgency in light of the modem Afro
American experience.
This article explores Second Amendment issues in light of the Afro-Amer
ican experience, concluding that the individual rights theory comports better
with the history of the right to bear arms in England and Colonial and post
Revolutionary America. The article also suggests that Second Amendment
issues need to be explored, not only with respect to how the right to keep and
bear arms has affected American society as a whole, but also with an eye
toward subcultures in American society who have been less able to rely on
state protection.
The remainder of this article is divided into five parts. Part I examines the
historical tension between the belief in the individual's right to bear arms and
the desire to keep weapons out of the hands of "socially undesirable" groups.
The English distrust of the lower classes, and then certain religious groups,
was replaced in America by a distrust of two racial minorities: Native Amer
icans and blacks. Part II examines antebellum regulations restricting black
firearms ownership and participation in the militia.

Part III examines the

intentions of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the
Second Amendment and how nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases limit
ing the scope of the Second Amendment were part of the general tendency of
the courts to limit the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Part also
examines restrictions on firearms ownership aimed at blacks in the postbel
lum Sout h and
the role of private violence in reclaiming white domination in
the South . Part I V examines black resistance to the violence that accompa

nied Jim Crow. In Part V, the article suggests directions of further inquiry
regarding political access, the current specter of black-on-black crime, and
the question of gun control today.

ities for blacks fr�m �nvasion by
c minal statute
designed to protect equal privileges and immun
_
Pnvate perso s United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 ( 1 876) (holding unconst1tut1onal a f�d
n );
.
t blacks from exercising
preven
era criminal
to
ing
statute designed to prevent whites from conspir

�

�

their constitutional right
s).

3 I . See infra Part IV.
32. See infra Part V.
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[. ARM E D CITIZENS, FREEMEN, AND WELL-REGULATED M IL IT IAS: THE
BEGINNINGS OF AN AFRO-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH AN

ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT
Any discussion of the Second Amendment should begin with the c ommon
place observation that the framers of the Bill of Rights did not believe they
were creating new rights. 33 Instead, they believe d that they were simply rec
ognizing rights already part of their English constitutional heritage and im
plicit in natural law.34 In fact, many of the framers cautioned against a bill
of rights, arguing that the suggested rights were inherent to a free people, and
that a specific detailing of rights would suggest that the new constitution
empowered the federal government to violate other traditional rights not
enumerated. 35
Thus, an analysis of the framers' intentions with respect to the Second
Amendment should begin with

an

examination of their perception of the

right to bear arms as one of the traditional rights of Englishmen, a right
necessary to perform the duty of militia service. Such an analysis is in part
an exercise in examining the history of arms regulation and militia service in
English legal history. But a simple examination of the right to own weapons
at English law combined with an analysis of t h e history of the militia in
English society is inadequate to a full understanding of the framers' under
standing of what they meant by "the right to keep and bear arms." By the
time the Bill of Rights was adopted, nearly two centuries of settlement in
North America had given Americans constitutional sensibilities similar to,
6
but nonetheless distinguishable from, those of their English counterparts. 3
American settlement had created its own history with respect to the right to
bear arms, a history based on English tradition, modified by the American
experience, and a history that was sharply influenced by the racial climate in
the American colonies.
3 3 . BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1 84- 89,

1 9 3-94 ( 1 967).

34 Id. Especially pertinent is John Philip R

that the

eid's reminder: "There are other dimensions
.
�andmg·anny
con troversy, � hen studied from the perspective of law, adds to our knowledge of the
.
.

mencan Revolullon. One is the degree to which eighteenth-century
Americans thought seven teen th
century English thoughts.
JOHN PHILLIP REIO, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAW: THE STAN DIN G·
A R M Y CONTROVERSY, THE Two CONSTITUTIONS,
AND THE COMING OF THE AME RICAN
REVOLUTION 4 ( 1 98 1 ) (emphasis added).
..

3 5 . See, e.g.. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexa
nder Hamilton).
36· Thi� can be seen with reference to the right
of trial by jury. A number of scholars have noted
hat Amencans '" th� late 1 8th century regarded
the right of trial by jury as including the right to
.
av e the Jury
decide issues of law as well as fact. This was, of course
a departure from trad i tion a l
.
.
E nghsh
practice. See MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSF
ORMATIO OF AMERICAN LA w , 1 7801 860. at 28-29 ( 1977)· WILL IAM E DWARD
NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMM ON LAW :
OF LEGA L CHAN GE ON M ASSA HUSETT
S SOCIE TY, 1 760-1 830, at 3 - 4, 8, 20- 30

�

�

·

.
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A . ENGLISH LAW AND TRADITION
The English settlers who populated North America in the seventeenth cen
tury were heirs to a tradition over five centuries old governing both the right
and duty to be armed. At English law, the idea of an armed citizenry respon
sible for the security of the community had long coexisted, perhaps some
what uneasily, with regulation of the ownership of arms, particularly along
class lines. The Assize of Arms of

1 18137

required the arming of all free

men, and required free men to possess armor suitable to their condition. 38
By the thirteenth century, villeins possessing sufficient property were also
expected to be armed and contribute to the security of the community.39
Lacking both professional police forces and a standing army,40 English law
and custom dictated that the citizenry

as

a whole, privately equipped, assist

in both law enforcement and in military matters. By law, all men between
sixteen and sixty were liable to be summoned into the sheriff's posse comita

tus. All subjects were expected to participate in the hot pursuit of criminal
suspects, supplying their own arms for the occasion. There were legal penal
ties for failure to participate. 41
Moreover, able-bodied men were considered part of the militia, although
by the sixteenth century the general practice was to rely on select groups
intensively trained for militia duty rather than to rely generally on the armed
male population. This move toward a selectively trained militia was an at
temp t to remedy the often indifferent proficiency and motivation that oc
curred when relying on the population as a whole.42
Although English law recognized a duty to be armed, it was a duty and a
right highly circumscribed by English class structure. The law often re
garded the common people as a dangerous class, useful perhaps in defending

shire and realm, but also capable of mischief with their weapons, mischief
toward each other, toward their betters, and toward their betters' game. Re
striction s on the type of arms deemed suitable for common people had long

been part of English law and custom. A sixteenth-century statute designed
as a crime control measure prohibited the carrying of handguns and cross-

37. SELECT CHARTERS & OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS Of ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE REIGN Of EDWARD THE FIRST 1 8 1-84 (H.W.C. Davis ed.,
Fred B. Cothman & Co 1985) ( 1 92 1).
38. I FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY Of ENGLISH LAW
BEFO RE THE TIME Of EDWARD I 42 1 - 42, 565 ( 1968).
39 . Id.
40. His torian Joyce Lee Malcolm notes that England did not have a standing army until the late
1 7th cen tury and did not have a professional police force until the nineteenth. See Malcolm, supra
note 9 , at 3 9 1 .
4 1 . AL AN HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 59 ( 1966); Malcolm, supra note 9,
at 39 1 .
42. Malcolm, supra note 9, at 391-92.
.
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bows by those with incomes of less than one hundred po�nds a ye�r. 43
.
Catholics were also often subject to being disarmed as potential subversives
after the English reformation. 44
It took the religious and political turmoil of seventeenth-century England
to bring about large scale attempts to disarm the English public and to bring
the right to keep arms under English constitutional protection. Post-Resto
ration attempts by Charles II to disarm large portions of the population
known or believed to be p olitical opponents, and James H's efforts to disarm
his Protestant opponents led, in

1689,

to the adoption of the Seventh provi

sion of the English Bill of Rights: "That the Subjects which are Protestants
may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed
by Law." 45
By the eighteenth century, the right to possess arms, both for p ersonal
protection and
viewed

as

as

a counterbalance against state power, had come to be

part of the rights of Englishmen by many on both sides of the

A tlantic. Sir William Blackstone listed the right to possess arms as one of
the five auxiliary rights of English subjects without which their primary
rights could not be maintained. 46 He discussed the right in traditional Eng43. Id. at 393.
44. Id. at 393-94.
45. Id. at 408.
46. l WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 143-45. Blackstone listed three primary
rights-the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private prop
erty-all of which he regarded as natural rights recognized and protected by the common law and
statutes of England. He also argued that these would be "dead letters" without the five auxiliary
rights which he listed as: ( l ) the constitution, powers and privileges of Parliament; (2) the limitation
of the king's prerogative; (3) the right to apply to the courts of justice for redress of injuries; (4) the
right of petitioning the King or either house of Parliament, and for the redress of grievances; and (5)
the right of subjects to have arms for their defence. Id. at * 1 2 1- 45.
Some commentators have argued that Blackstone's remarks and other evidence of English com
mon-law and statutory rights to possess arms should be viewed in the light of the extensive regula
tion of firearms that traditionally existed in England and also in light of English strict gun control in
the 20th century. See, e.g SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &
GORDON HAWKINS, THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO GUN CONTROL 142- 43 ( 1987); Ehrman & Heni
gan, supra note 6, at 9-10. Two points should be made in that regard. First, much of English
fir� nns regulation had �n explicit class base largely inapplicable in the American context. Second,
nett her a com r_non la� nght to keep and bear arms nor a similar statutory right such as existed in
.
the English Bill of Rights of 1 689 would, in the light of Parliamentary supremacy, be a bar to
suMequent statutes repealing or modifying that right. Blackstone is cited here not as evidence that
the Engl ish right, in �r�ise f rrn and content, became the American right; instead it is evidence
�
.
that the idea
of an md1v1dual nght to keep and bear arms existed on both sides of the Atlantic in the
1 8th century.
Blackstone's importance to this discussion is twofold. His writings
on the right to possess arms
can be taken as partial evidence of what the framers of the Second Amendm
ent regarded as a mong
.
the nghts of Enghshmen that they sought to preserve. Blacksto
ne's
greatly influenced late
views
. n legal though
1 8t h-century Amenca
t. But Blackstone's importance in this regard does not cease
with the Sa:ond Amendment. Blackstone also greatly
influenc ed 1 9th-centu ry American legal
thinkin g. One influential antebel lum American jurist,
Justice Joseph Story, was significantly inftu.•
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lish terms:
The fifth and last auxiliary right ofthe subject, that I shall at present men
tion, is that of having

arms

for their defence, suitable to their condition and

degree, and such as are allowed by law, which is also declared by the same
statute 1 W. & M. st. 2

c.

2 and is indeed a public allowance, under due

restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when
the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the vio
lence of oppression. 47

B. ARMS AND RACE IN COLONIAL AMERICA
If the English tradition involved a right and duty to bear arms qualified by
class and later religion, both the right and the duty were strengthened in the
earliest American

settle

ments From the beginning, English settlement in
North America had a quasi military character, an obvious response to harsh
frontier conditions. Governors of settlements often also held the title of mili
.

-

tia captain, reflecting both the civil and military nature of their office. Spe
cial effort was made to ensure that white men, capable of bearing arms, were
imported into the colonies. 48 Far from the security of Britain, often border
ing on the colonies of other frequently hostile European powers, colonial
governments viewed the arming of able-bodied white men and the require

al to a colony's survival.
There was another reason for the renewed emph asis on the right and duty

ment that they perform mil i tia service

as essenti

to be armed in America: race. Britain's American colonies were home to
three often antagonistic races: red, white, and black. For the settlers of Britenced by his readings of Blackstone. See

STORY:

STATESMAN

Am end men t

as

OF

R.

KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JumCE JOSEPH

THE OLD REPUBLIC 4().45, 137, 246 ( 1 985). Story viewed the Second

vitally important in maintaining a free republic. In his Commentaries on the Consti·

tution. he wrote:

The right of the citizens to keep, and bear arms has justly been considered, as the palla·
di um of the liberties of a republic; since it olfers a strong moral check against the usurpa
tion and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if they are successful in the first
i n stance, enable the people to resist, and triumph over them.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTA RIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 708 (Carolina
Academic Press 1987) ( 1 833).
Whi le it would be inaccurate to attribute Story's Second Amendment views solely to hi5 reading
of Black stone, Blackstone doubtless helped inftuence Story and other early 1 91h-cen1ury lawyen
a nd j u ri sts to regard the right to keep and bear arms as an important prerogative of free citizen5.
All of this is important for our discussion, not only with regard to antebellum opinion concerning
the Second A mendment, but also in considering the cultural and legal climate that infonned the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendmen t who intended to extend what were commonly regarded as

the righ ts of free men to the freedmen, and who also intended to extend the Bill of Rights 10 the
slates . See infra Part III.
47. l B LA C KSTON E supra note 46, at • 143.44,
48. A B BOTT E. SMITH, COLONISTS I N BoNDAGE: WHITE SERVITUDE AND CONVICT LABOR IN
AME R ICA, 1 607- 1 776, al 30-34 (Norton 197 1 ) (1947).
,
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ish North America, an armed and universally deputized white population
was necessary not only to ward off dangers from the armies of other Euro
pean powers, but also to ward off attacks from the indigenous population
which feared the encroachment of English settlers on their lands. An armed
white population was also essential to maintain social control over blacks
and Indians who toiled unwillingly as slaves and servants in

English

settlements. 49
This need for racial control helped transform the traditional English right
into a much broader American one. If English law had qualified the right to
possess arms by class and religion, American law was much less concerned
with such distinctions. 50 Initially all Englishmen, and later all white men,
were expected to possess and bear arms to defend their commonwealths, both
from external threats and from the internal ones posed by blacks and Indi
ans.

The statutes of many colonies specified that white men be armed at

public expense. 5 1 In most colonies, all white men between the ages of sixteen
and sixty, usually with the exception of clergy and religious objectors, were
Not only were

considered part of the militia and required to be armed.52

white men required to perform traditional militia and posse duties, they were
also required to serve as patrollers, a specialized posse dedicated to keeping
order among the slave population, in those colonies with large slave popula
tions. 53 This broadening of the right to keep and bear arms reflected a more
general lessening of class, religious, and ethnic distinctions among whites in
colonial America. The right to possess arms was, therefore, extended to
classes traditionally viewed with suspicion in England, including the class of
indentured servants. 54
If there were virtually universal agreement concerning the need to arm the
ss the
·
popu1atlon,
law was much more ambivalent with respect to

w h.1te

49. BooRSTlN, supra note 1 8, at 3SS-56.
50. Id.

at

353.

5 1 . See A. LEON HIGGINBOTH AM, JR., IN THE MATIER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICA N
P
LF.GAl. ROCESS: THE CoLONIAL PERIOD 32 (197 8).

sho�ld also be added that the abundant game found in North America during the colonial
. at the need
�h mm
ed
for the kind of game laws that had traditionally disarmed the lower
classes m England. Malcolm, supra note 9, at 393.94,
It

pcnod

s i . See. e.g. . 2 LAWS OF THE ROYAL COLONY OF N EW
JERSEY 1 5-2 1 49 96 1 33 289
1977).

Bush ed.,

•

5 3 . H1G<J1NBOTHAM, supra

•

•

•

(Bernard

note S I , at 26()..262.
For a g� !discussion of the elevation of the rights of
white indentured servants as a means of
m a m ta m m g soc1a control over the black population, see
M
generally EDMUND S. ORGA N ' AMERIC A N s I.AVERY , A MERICAN fREEDO M T�� 'Q
RDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA ( 1 975).
:
5 5 . Stephen Halbrook notes that V1rg
tma s royal government in the late 17th century became
.
very concerned that the widcspread practice
of carrying arms wou Id tend to "
1oment rebell'10n, and
1 ha t . a.-; a result, statutes were enacted to prevent
groups of men from gathering with arms. See
H A I . BROOK 0 THAT Evuv M AN BE A�M ED,
supra note 6, at 56-57. The sharpening of racial
distinctions and the need for greater social control
over slaves that occurred toward the end of the
54·

·

·

·
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blacks. The progress of slavery in colonial America reflected English lack of
familiarity with the institution, in both law and custom. 56 In some colonies,
kidnapped Africans initially were treated like other indentured servants, held
for a term of years and then released from forced labor and allowed to live as
free people. 57 In some colonies, the social control of slaves was one of the
law's major concerns; in others, the issue was largely of private concern to
the slave owner.58
These differences were reflected in statutes concerned with the right to
possess arms and the duty to perform militia service. One colony-Vir
ginia-provides a striking example of how social changes were reflected, over
time, in restrictions concerning the right to be armed. A Virginia statute
. enacted in 1639 required the arming of white men at public expense.59 The
statute did not specify the arming of black men, but it also did not prohibit
black men from arming themselves. 60 By 1680 a Virginia statute prohibited
Negroes, slave and free, from carrying weapons, including clubs.61 Yet, by
the early eighteenth century, free Negroes who were house owners were per
mitted to keep one gun in their house, while blacks, slave and free, who lived
on frontier plantations were able to keep guns.62 Virginia's experience re
flected three sets of concerns: the greater need to maintain social control over
the black population as caste lines sharpened;63 the need to use slaves and
free blacks to help defend frontier plantations against attacks by hostile Indi
ans; and the recognition on the part of Virginia authorities of the necessity
for gun ownership for those living alone.
These concerns were mirrored in the legislation of other colonies. Massa
chusetts did not have general legislation prohibiting blacks from carrying
arms, 64 but free Negroes in that colony were not permitted to participate in
seventeenth and beginning of the 1 8th century lessened the concern authorities had over the armed
white population. See MORGAN, supra note 54, at 354-55.
56. See Raymond T. Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's Thesis on the Intent of a
Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 VAND. L. REV. 93, 101-102 ( 1989) (colonies dealt with slavery in an
unsystematic and piecemeal fashion). See generally WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK:
AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE NEGRO, 1550- 1 8 1 2, at 48-52 ( 1968).
57. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 5 1 , at 2 1-22.
.
58. See HERBERT APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS (5th ed. 1983); Diamond,
supra n ote 56, at 101- 102, 104; Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Book Review, 56 TuL.
L. REV . 1 107, 1 1 1 0- 1 1 1 2 (1 982) (reviewing A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATIER OF
COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978)).
59. 1 WILLIAM w. HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE Of VIRGINIA 226 (New York, R. & W. & G.
Bartow 1 823); see HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 51, at 32.
60. 1 HENING, supra note 59, at 226; see HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 5 1 , at 32.
6 1 . HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 5 1 , at 39.
62. Id. at 5 8 .
63 . Id. a t 38-40.
64. Higginbotham informs us that the Boston selectmen passed such
slaves had allegedly committed arson in 1724. See id. at 76.
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militia drills; instead they were required to perform substitute service on pub
lic works projects. 6S New Jersey exempted blacks and Indians from militia
service, though the colony permitted free Negroes to possess firearms.66
Ironically, South Carolina, which had the harshest slave codes of this period,
may have been the colony most enthusiastic about extending the right to bear
arms to free Negroes. With its majority black population, that state's need to
control the slave population was especially acute. 67 To secure free black
assistance in controlling the slave population, South Carolina in the early
eighteenth century permitted free blacks the right of suffrage, the right to
keep firearms, and the right to undertake militia service. 68 As the eighteenth
century unfolded, those rights were curtailed. 69
Overall, these laws reflected the desire to maintain white supremacy and
control. With respect to the right to possess arms, the colonial experience
had largely eliminated class, religious, and ethnic distinctions among the
white population. Those who had been part of the suspect classes in Eng
land-the poor, religious dissenters, and others who had traditionally only
enjoyed a qualified right to possess arms-found the right to be considerably
more robust in the American context. But blacks had come to occupy the
social and legal space of the suspect classes in England. Their right to posses
arms was highly dependent on white opinion of black loyalty and reliability.
Their inclusion in the militia of freemen was frequently confined to times of
crisis. Often, there were significant differences between the way northern and
65. See LoRENZO J. GREENE, THE NEGRO IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 127 (1 968). Greene
notes that blacks probably served in New England militias until the latter part of the 17th century.

Id. It is interesting to note that, despite this prohibition on militia service, blacks served with New
England forces during the French and Indian Wars. Id. at 1 88-89. Winthrop Jordan notes that in

1652 the Massachusetts General Court ordered Scotsmen, Indians, and Negroes to train with the

Militia, but that, in 1656, Massachusetts and, in 1660, Connecticut excluded blacks from Militia
service. See JORDAN, supra note 56, at 7 1 .
66 . See 2 LAWS OF THE ROYAL COLONY OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 52, at 49, 96, 289.

67. For a good discussion of black life in colonial South Carolina, see generally PETER H.

WOOD, BLACK MAJORITY: NEGROES IN COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1670 THROUGH THE

STONO REBELLION (1974).

South Carolina in 1739 was the scene of the Stono Rebellion, one of the largest slave rebellions in
North America. A recent study of the rebellion suggests that the presence of large numbers of

African born men from the Kingdom of the Kongo played a critical role. The Kingdom, including
parts of modern Zaire, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, and Angola, had been heavily influenced by

Portugese traders and missionaries in such areas as language, religion, and contemporary European

military tactics including the use of firearms. The Stono Rebellion illustrated both the internal and

external threats faced by many colonies. First, the presence of large numbers of African slaves,
familiar with European military tactics and technology, posed a threat to slave society in South

Carolina. Second, this threat .was further enhanced by the fact that South Carolina bordered on the
Spanish colony of Florida.

Historical accounts of the rebellion indicate that Portugese-speaking

Catholic slaves acted in concert with Spanish agents. See generally John K. Thornton, African

Dimensions of the Stono Rebellion, 96 AM. HIST. REV. 1 10 1 ( 1 99 1 )
68. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 5 1 , at 201-15.

69. Id.
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southern colonies approached this question, a reflection of the very different
roles that slavery played in the two regions. These differences would become
sharper after the Revolution, when the northern states began to move toward
the abolition of slavery and the southern states, some of which had also con
sidered abolition, 70 began to strengthen the institution.
Ironically, while the black presence in colonial America introduced a new
set of restrictions concerning the English law of arms and the militia, it
helped strengthen the view that the security of the state was best achieved
through the arming of all free citizens. It was this new view that was part of
the cultural heritage Americans brought to the framing of the Constitution.
C. THE RIGHT OF

WHICH

PEOPLE?

1 . Revolutionary Ideals

The colonial experience helped strengthen the appreciation of early Ameri
cans for the merits of an armed citizenry. That appreciation was strength
ened yet further by the American Revolution. If necessity forced the early
colonists to arm, the Revolution and the friction with Britain's standing
army that preceded it-and in many ways precipitated it-served to revital
ize Whiggish notions that standing armies were dangerous to liberty, and
that militias, composed of the whole of the people, best protected both liberty
and security. 1 1
These notions soon found their way into the debates over the new constitu
tion, debates which help place the language and meaning of the Second
Amendment in context. Like other provisions of the proposed constitution,
the clause that gave Congress the power to provide for the organizing, arm
ing, and disciplining of the militia72 excited fears among those who believed
that the new constitution could be used to destroy both state power and indi
vidual rights.7 3
70. See Robert J. Cottrol, Liberalism and Paternalism: Ideology, Economic Interest and the BusiLaw of Slavery, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3 59, 363-64 (1987).

ness

7 1 . See generally REID, supra note 34.
72. That clause is now found in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I S.
73. Elbridge Gerry of Massachus etts thought a national government which controlled the militia
would be potentially despotic. James Madison's Notes on the Constitutional Convention of 1 787
(Aug. 2 1 , 1 787), in I 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 9 1 6 (Wilbowin E. Benton, ed.,
1 986). With this power, national government "may enslave the States." Id. at 846. Ohver Ells
worth of Connecticut suggested that "[t)he whole authority over the Militi� ought by no mcans to
.
be taken away from the States whose consequence would pine away to nothing after such a sacnficc
of power." Id. at 909.
It is interesting, in light of the c u rrent debate, that both advocates and opponents of this increase
in fed e ral power assumed that the militia they were discussing would be one that e� rolled almost all
of the whi te male population between the ages of 16 and 60, and that that ��� la on wo� ld supply
th eir own arms. George Mason of Virginia proposed "the idea of a select m1ht1a, but withdrew 1t.
Id. at 909.

�!
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Indeed, it was the very universality of the militia that was the source of
some of the objections. A number of critics of the proposed constitution
feared that the proposed congressional power could subject the whole popu
lation to military discipline and a clear threat to individual liberty.74 Others
complained that the Militia Clause provided no exemptions for those with
religious scruples against bearing arms. 75
But others feared that the Militia Clause could be used to disarm the popu
lation as well as do away with the states' control of the militia. Some critics
expressed fear that Congress would use its power to establish a select militia,
a group of men specially trained and armed for militia duty, similar to the
earlier English experience. 76 Richard Henry Lee of Virginia argued that that
select militia might be used to disarm the population and that, in any event,
it would pose more of a danger to individual liberty than a militia composed
of the whole population. He charged that a select militia "commits the many
to the mercy and the prudence of the few."77 A number of critics objected to
giving Congress the power to arm the militia, fearing that such power would
likewise give Congress the power to withhold arms from the militia. 7 8 At the
constitutional convention, Massachusetts delegate Elbridge Gerry saw such
potential danger in giving the new government power over the militia, that
he declared:
This power in the United States as explained is making the states drill ser
geants. He had as lief let the citizens of Massachusetts be disarmed, as to

take the command from the states, and subject them to the General
lature. It wo uld be regarded as

Legis

a system of Despot ism. 7 9

The fear that this new congressional authority could be used to both destroy
state power over the militia and to disarm the people led delegates to state
ratifying conventions to urge measures that would preserve the traditional
74. This was a view argued by Luther Martin before the Maryland House of Representatives.
�uther Martin Before the Maryland House of Representatives ( 1 787), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEOE�AL- CONVENTION OF 1 787, at 1 57 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter THE RECORDS OF
THI' FEDf.RAl. co� VENTION ) . Samuel Bryan, a Pennsylvania pamphleteer who argued against the
.
proposed const1tut1on,
argued that it could subject the whole population to military discipline. Sa
muel Br: an, letter to the People of Pennsylvania, INDEPENDEN T GAZETTEER , Oct. S, 1 78 7 ' re
printed m THE ANT� F�DERALISTS 22-23, 27 (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., 1 966). A number of critics

argued that the prov1s1on was a threat to the liberty of every man from
16 to 60. Id. at 57. Thus,
the l�nguage of the �ifth Amendment requiring grand jury proceeding
s for cases arising in the
.
mahtaa, except when m actual service during time of war or public
danger, may have been in re
sponse to this fear.
7s. T E ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 74, at 57. This
concern was the reason for the origi nal
H
language of the Second Amendment. See supra
note 4.
76. Stt supra text accompanying note 43.
THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 74, at 228.
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra
note 74, at 385-87; 3 id. at 208-09,
H F.
272. ·2 5

;�-

;�

79. 2 T H E R ECORDS OF THE FEDER AL CONVE
NTION, supra note 74, at 385.
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right. The Virginia convention proposed language that would provide pro
tection for the right to keep and bear arms in the federal constitution. 80
In their efforts to defend the proposed constitution, Alexander Hamilton
and James Madison addressed these charges. Hamilton's responses are inter
esting because he wrote as someone openly skeptical of the value of the mili
tia of the whole. The former Revolutionary War artillery officer8t expressed
the view that, while the militia fought bravely during the Revolution, it had
proven to be no match when pitted against regular troops. Hamilton, who
Madison claimed initially wanted to forbid the states from controlling any
land or naval forces, 82 called for uniformity in organizing and disciplining of
the militia under national authority. He also urged the creation of a select
militia that would be more amenable to the training and discipline he saw
necessary. 83

as

In what was perhaps a concession to sentiment favoring the

militia of the whole, Hamilton stated: "Little more can be reasonably aimed
at, with respect to the people at large, than to have them properly armed and
equipped; and in order to see that this not be neglected, it will be necessary to
assemble them once or twice in the course of a year."84
If Hamilton gave only grudging support to the concept of the militia of the
whole, Madison, author of the Second Amendment, was a much more vigor
ous defender of the concept. He answered critics of the Militia Clause provi
sion allowing Congress to arm the militia by stating that the term "arming "
meant only that Congress's authority to arm extended only to prescribing the
type o f arms the militia would use, not to furnishing them. 85 But Madison's

80. The Virginia convention urged the adoption of the following language:
That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, com
posed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence for
a free state; that standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and therefore
ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the community will
admit; and that in all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to, and
governed by, the civil power.
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN
TOGETH E R WITH THE JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION

Ayer Co. 1 987) ( 1907) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] .

1 787
657-59 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,

8 1 . RICHARD B. MORRIS, SEVEN WHO SHAPED OUR DESTINY: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AS
228, 237-49 (1973).
82. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 74, at 293.
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 1 6 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Heritage Press 1945). For a

R EVOLUTIONARIES

modern study that supports Hamilton' s views concerning the military ineffectiveness of the militia,
see BOOR STIN, supra note 18, at 3 5 2-72.
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 1 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Heritage Press 1945). Interest·
ingly enough, Hamilton's views anticipated the state of modern law on t is subj�ct! th� Natio �� I
_
Guard has, in effect, become a select militia with a much larger reserve m1htta ex1stmg m the c1t1·

�

zenry at large.

85. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 80, at 464-65.
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views went further. He envisioned a militia consisting of virtually the entire
white male population, writing that a militia of 500,000 citizens86 could pre
vent any excesses that might be perpetrated by the national government and
its regular army. Madison left little doubt that h e envisioned the militia of
the whole

as

a potential counterweight to tyrannical excess on the part o f the

government:
Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed;
and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government: still it
would not be going too far to say, that the State governments with the
people on their side, would be able to repel the danger.

The highest

number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can

be carried in any country does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole
number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms.

This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army more than
twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia
amounting to near half a million citizens with arms in their hands, officered
by men chosen among themselves, fighting for their common liberties and

united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confi
dence. It may well be doubted whether a militia thus circumstanced could
ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are
best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this country against
the British arms will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides
the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the peo
ple of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments,
to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are ap
pointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insur
mou ntable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of.
Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of
Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the. . .
gove rnments are afraid to trust the people with arms . . . . B7

It is against this background that the meaning of the Second Amendment
must be considered. For the revolutionary generation, the idea of the militia
an d �n armed population were related. The principal reason for preferring a
_ _

m1h t1a of the whole over either a standing army or a select militia was rooted

�n t�e �d ea that, whatever

the inefficiency of the militia of the whole, the

mst1tut1on would better protect the newly won freedoms than a reliance on

security provided by some more select body.
116· T H F. FF.OEll� LIST No. 46, at 3 1 9 (James
Madison) (The Heritage Press 1 945). The cens us of
I 790 h5ted the white male population over
age 16 as 8 1 3 ,298 . J
"ee B UREAU OF THE cENSUS, u . S.
.
DrP'T
OF CoMMF.RCE, STATIST ICAL HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIM ES TO
THF. PRFSf.NT 16 ( 1 976) The census d"d
. the number
t not 11st
over 60 that would have been exem pt
from mahtt a duty.
·

.

.

87. Id.

.
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2. Racial Limitations
One year after the ratification of the Second Amendment and the Bill of
Rights, Congress passed legislation that reaffirme d the notion of the militia of
the whole and explicitly introduced a racial component into the national de
liberations on the subject of the militia. The Uniform Militia Act88 called for
the e nrollment of every free, able-bodied white male citizen between the ages
of eighteen and forty-five into the militia. The act further specified that every
militia member was to provide himself with a m usket or firelock, a bayonet,
and ammunition.
This specification of a racial qualification for militia membership was
somewhat at odds with general practice in the late eighteenth century. De
spite its recognition and sanctioning of slavery, 89 the Constitution had no
racial definition of citizenship. 90 Free Negroes voted in a majority of states. 91

A number of states had militia provisions that allowed free Negroes to par
ticipate. 92 Particularly in the northern states, many were well aware that free
Negroes and former slaves had served with their state forces during the
Revolution.93 Despite the prejudices of the day, lawmakers in late eight
eenth-century America were significantly less willing to write racial restric
tions into constitutions and other laws guaranteeing fundamental rights than
were their counterparts a generation or so later in the nineteenth century. 94

The 1 792 statute restricting militia enrollment to white men was one of the
earliest federal statutes to make a racial distinction.
The significance of this restriction is not altogether clear. For the South,
there was a clear desire to have a militia that was reliable and could be used
to suppress potential slave insurrections. But despite the fear that free Ne
groes might make common cause with slaves, and despite federal law, some
southern states in the antebellum period enrolled free blacks as militia mem88. I Stat. 27 1 .
89. See U.S. CONST. art. I , § 2, cl. 3 (three-fifths of slave population counted for apportionment

purposes); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. I (importation of slaves allowed until 1 808); U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 2, cl. 3 (escaped slaves must be "delivered up" to their masters).

90. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3 (specifying congressional representation) is often cited for the
proposition that blacks were not citizens because of the three-fifths clause. It should be noted that,
under this clause, free Negroes were counted as whole persons for purposes of representation. The
original wording of this provision specifically mentioned "white and other citizens," but that lan
guage was deleted by the committee on style as redundant. See 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note

7 8, at 45 1 .
9 1 . See infra Part II; see also Robert J. Cottrol, A Tale of Two Cultures: Or Making the Proper
Con nections Between Law, Social History and The Political Economy of Despair, 25 SAN DIEGO L.
REV . 989, 1004 & nn. 86-88 ( 1 988).

92. JOR DAN, supra note 56, at 1 25-26, 41 1 - 1 2.
.
93. Robert J. Cottrol, Law, Politics and Race in Urban America: Towards a New Synthesis, 1 7
RUTGE RS L.J. 483, 503 & n. 1 29 ( 1 986).
.
.
en
94. Robert J. Cottrol, The Thirteenth Amendment and the North 's Overlooked Ega/uanan
tage, 1 1 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 198, 202-03 ( 1 989) (discussing racism in early 1 9th-century Amenca).
.

1!

[Vol. 80:309

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

332

bers. 9s Northern states at various times also enrolled free Negroes in the
militia despite federal law and often strident prej udice.96 States North and
South employed free Negroes in state forces during times of invasion.97
While southern states often prohibited slaves from carrying weapons and
strictly regulated access to firearms by free Negroes,98 northern states gener
ally made no racial distinction with respect to the right to own firearms,99
and federal law was silent on the subject.
The racial restriction in the 1792 statute indicates the unrest the revolu
tionary generation felt toward arming blacks and perhaps the recognition
that one of the functions of the militia would indeed be to put down slave
revolts. Yet, the widespread use of blacks as soldiers in time of crisis and the
absence of restrictions concerning the arming of blacks in the northern states
may provide another clue concerning how to read the Second Amendment.
The 1 792 act specified militia enrollment for white men between the ages of
eighteen and forty-five. 1 00 Yet, while it specifically included only this limited
portion of the population,

the statute excluded no one from militia service.

The authors of the statute had experience, in the Revolution, with a militia
Older and

and Continental Army considerably broad i n membership.

younger men had served with the Revolutionary forces. Blacks had served,
though their service had been an object of considerable controversy. 1 0 1 Even
women had served, though, given the attitudes of the day, this was far more
controversial than black service. Given this experience and the fact that the
constitutional debates over the militia had constantly assumed an enrollment
of the male population between sixteen and sixty, it is likely that the framers
of the 1 792 statute envisioned a militia even broader than the one they speci
fie d. This suggests to us how broad the term "people" in the Second Amend
ment was meant to be.
The 1 792 statute also suggests to us also how crucial race has been in our
95._ See JORDAN supra note 56, at 125-26, 411-12 (in varying degrees, North Carolina, South
.
Carohna, and Georgia); BERNARD c. NALTY, STRENGTH FOR THE FIGHT: A HISTORY OF BLA CK
A M E R ICA NS IN THE MILITARY 20 (1986) (same).
96. See JORDAN , supra note 56, at 125-26 ("Although [the exclusion of Negroes from the militia]
lay on the s�atute books of all four New England colonies, Negroes served in New England forces in
every colonial war
Additionally • and m varymg degrees, New York, New Jersey, Pennsy lvam a,
and Delaware tncluded Negroes.).
97 · This was particularly true during the War of
1812. See ROBERT J COTIROL THE AFRO
'.
y AN KEES: PROVIDENCE'S BLACK COMMUNITY IN THE
ANTEBE LLUM ER 63 (1982) EUG ENE D.
G EN O V ES E. Rou, JORDON, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES
ALTY supra
MADE 1 55 (1976)note 95. at 24-28.
·"

·

·

·

.

�

:�· ;ee :n.r:�a
·..,

Ium

au

north.

•

'

Part II.A;

17
t n kelman,

see also STAMPP, supra note 27, at 208-28.
Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendm en t: Black Legal Rights n the A n tebel
i
-

R UTGERS l.J.

supra note 88.
NALTY. supra note 95

100. See

N

415, 476 (1986).

IOI.
at 10- 1 8
AM E RICAN R EVOLUTION (196 ) ).
•

·

See generally BENJAMIN QUARLES THE NEGRO IN TH E
'
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history. If the racial distinction made in that statute was somewhat anoma
lous in the late eighteenth century, it was the kind of distinction that would
become more common in the nineteenth. The story of blacks and arms
would continue in the nineteenth century as racial distinctions became
sharper and the defense of slavery more militant.
II.

ARMS AND THE ANTEBELLUM EXPERIENCE

If, as presaged by the Uniform Militia Act of 1792 , 1 02 racial distinctions
became sharper in the nineteenth century, that development was at odds with
the rhetoric of the Revolution and with developments of the immediate post
revolutionary era. 103 Flush with the precepts of egalitarian democracy,
America had entered a time of recognition and expansion of rights. Eleven
of the thirteen original states, as well as Vermont, passed new constitutions
in the period between 1 776 and 1777 . 104 Five of these states rewrote their
constitutions by the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1 79 1 . 10� A
twelfth original state, Massachusetts, passed a new constitution in 1 780. 106
Many of the new constitutions recognized the status of citizens as "free and
equal" or "free and independent."107 In Massachusetts and Vermont, these
clauses were interpreted as outlawing the institution of slavery. 1 08 Many of
the new constitutions guaranteed the right to vote regardless of race to all
men who otherwise qualified, 1 09 and guaranteed many of the rights that
102. 1 Stat. 27 1; see supra note 88.
103. See Raymond T. Diamond & Robert J. Cottrol, Codifying Caste: Louisiana 's Racial Classifi
cation Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 Lov. L. RE V . 255, 260-63 (1983).
104. See FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (Benjamin P. Poore ed., 2d ed., Washington, Government Printing
Office 1 878) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS} . Massachusetts passed a new con
stitution in 1 780. I id. at 956. Rhode Island would not do so until 1 842. 2 id. at 1 603.
1 05. These states were: Georgia in 1 789, see 1 id. at 384; New Hampshire in 1784, see 2 id. at
1 280; Pennsylvania in 1 790, see 2 id. at I 548; South Carolina in 1 778 and 1780, see 2 id. at 1 620,
1 628; and Vermont in 1786, see 2 id. at 1 866.
1 06. I id. at 956.
107. See N.H. CONST. of 1 784, pt. I, art. I, 2 FEDERAL A N D STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
1 04, at 1 280; CONN. CONST. of 1 776, pmbl., I FEDERAL A N D STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
104, at 257; MASS. CONST. of 1 780, pt. I, art. I, I FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 104, at 957; PA. CONST. of 1 776, declaration of rights, art. I, 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTI
TUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 54 1 ; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § I. 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CON
STITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 554; VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. I, art. I, 2 FEDERAL A N D STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1 04, at 1 867; VT. CONST. of 1 776, bill of rights, § I, 2 FEDERAL A N D
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104. at 1908.
108. See Diamond, supra note 56, at !03 nn.59-6 1 .
1 09. See, e.g. , GA. CONST. of 1 779, art. IV, § I , I FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, .rupra
note 1 04, at 386; Mo. CONST. O F 1 776, art. II, I FEDERAL A N D STATE CONSTITUTIONS. supra note
1 04, at 82 1; MASS. CONST. of 1 776, pt. I. declaration of rights, art. IX, I FEDERAL A N D STATF.
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1 04, at 958; N.H. CONST. OF 1 784. pt. I. bill of rights. art. XI. 2
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 28 1 ; N.J. CONST. of 1 776, art. IV. 2
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 3 1 1 ; N.C. CONST. of 1776. constitution

3 34
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would later be recognized in the Bill of Rights. 1 1 0 In no instance were any of
these rights limited only to the white population; several states explicitly ex
tended rights to the entire population irrespective of race. 1 1 1
The right to vote, perhaps the most fundamental of rights, was limited in
almost all instances to men who met property restrictions, but in most states
was not limited according to race. 1 1 2 Ironically, only in the nineteenth-cen
tury would black voting rights be curtailed, as Jacksonian democracy ex
panded voting rights for whites. 1 1 3 In its constitution of 1 82 1 , New York
eliminated a one hundred dollar property requirement for white males, and
concomitantly increased the requirement to two hundred fifty dollars for

or frame of government, art. IX, 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 141 112; PA. CONST. of 1 776, declaration of rights, art. VII, 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 104, at 1 541; VT. CONST. of 1 777, ch. 1 , declaration of rights, art. VIII, 2 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1859.
Only Georgia, under its 1776 constitution, and South Carolina, in its 1 790 constitution, provided
explicit racial restrictions on the right to vote. See GA. CONST. of 1 776, art. IX, 1 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 379; s.c. CONST. of 1 790, art. I § 4, 2 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1628.
1 1 0. See, e.g. , GA. CONST. of 1 776, art. LXI, 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITUTIONS, supra
note 104, at 283 (freedom of the press); MASS. CONST. of 1 780, pt. l , declaration of rights, art.
XVIII, 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 959 (freedom of assembly);
Mo. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, art. XXVII, 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 104, at 8 1 9 (prohibiting quartering troops in homes); N.H. CONST. of 1 776, declaration
of rights, art. XXIII, 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 959 (limits on
searches and seizures and on general warrants); PA. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, art. XII,
2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 542 (freedom of speech); s.c. CONST.
of 1 778, art. XLI, 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 627 (due process of
law); VA. CONST. of 1 776, bill of rights, § 16, 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
104, at 1 909 (freedom of religion); VT. CONST. of 1 786, ch. 1 , declaration of rights, art. XVIII, 2
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 869 (right to bear arms).
of 1 776, art. LVI, 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
at 283; GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 5, 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
104, at 386; Mo. CONST. of 1 776, art. XXXIII, 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 104, at 8 1 9-20 (freedom of religion for "all persons"); N.C. CONST. of 1 776, art. VIII (rights in
criminal proceedings to be informed of charges, to confront witnesses, and to remain silent for
"every man," and freedom of religion for "all men"), 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 104, at 1409; N.Y. CoNST. of 1 777, art. XIII (due process to be denied "no member of
this state"), art. XXXVIII (freedom of religion "to all mankind"); PA.CONST. of 1776, art. II (free
dom of religion for "all men"), art. VIII (due process for "every member of society"), 2 FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1 04, at 1 54 1 ; PA. CONST. of 1 790, art. XI, § 3 (freedom of
religion to be denied to "no person"), art. XI, § 7 (freedom of the press for "every person" and
freedom of speech for "every citizen"), art. XI, § 1 0 (due process to be denied to "no person"), 2
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 1 5 54-55; s.c. CONST. of 1 778, art.
XXXVIII (freedom of religion), 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 162627; s.c. CONST. of 1 790, art. VIII (freedom of religion "to all mankind"), 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, § supra note 104, at 1632.
1 1 2. See COTTROL, supra note 97, at 42-43.
1 1 3 . See Cottrol, supra note 93, at 508-09. This is not to say that voting limitations were the sole
1 1 1 . See GA. CONST.

104,

measure of the failure of Jacksonian democracy to include blacks.

Id.

at

508- 1 3 .
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blacks. 1 14 Other states would eliminate black voting rights altogether. • t s
Other than Maine, no state admitted to the union in the nineteenth century's
antebellum period allowed blacks to vote. 1 1 6
This curtailment of black voting rights was part and parcel of a certain
hostility toward free blacks, a hostility that ran throughout the union of
states. In northern states, where slavery had been �bandoned or was not a

serious factor in social or economic relations, such hostility was the result of
simple racism. 1 17 In southern states, where slavery was an integral part of
the social and economic framework, this hqstility was occasioned b y the
threat that free blacks posed to the system of Negro slavery.1 1 s
A. THE SOUTHERN ANTEBELLUM EXPERIENCE: CONTROL OF ARMS AS A
MEANS OF RACIAL OPPRESSION

The threat that free blacks posed to southern slavery was twofold. First,
free blacks were a bad example to slaves. For a slave to see free blacks enjoy
the trappings of white persons-freedom of movement, expression, and asso
ciation, relative freedom from fear for one's person and one's family, and
freedom to own the fruits of one's labor-was to offer hope and raise desire
for that which the system could not produce. A slave with horizons limited
only to a continued existence in slavery was a slave who did not threaten the
system, 1 19 whereas a slave with visions of freedom threatened rebellion.
This threat of rebellion is intimately related to the second threat that free
blacks posed to the system of Negro slavery, the threat that free blacks might
instigate or participate in a rebellion by their slave brethren. To forestall this
threat of rebellion, southern legislatures undertook to limit the freedom of
1 1 4. N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. II, superceding N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. VII; see also Dixon R.
Fox, The Negro Vote in Old New York. in FREE BLACKS IN AMERICA, 1800-1860, at 95, 97- 1 12
(John H. Bracey, Jr. et. al. eds., 1 970).
1 1 5. See COTIROL, supra note 97, at 42-43.
1 1 6. LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790- 1 860,
at 7 9 ( 1 961).
1 1 7. It is to be questioned whether racism is ever "simple." Winthrop Jordan has theorized that
the English and their cultural descendants were culturally predisposed to racism. JORDAN, supra
note 56, at 3- 43. Carl Jung has suggested that for white Americans the Negro represents the part of
the unconscious that requires repression. ALEXANDER THOMAS & SAMUEL SILLEN, RACISM AND
PSYCHIATRY 13-14 (1972); ''America Facing its Most Tragic Moment"-Dr. Carl Jung, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1912, § 5, at 3. Whatever accounts for racism, it is clear that racism is capable of
actuating the lawmaking process. See generally HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 51.
1 1 8. See STAMPP, supra note 27, at 2 1 5-17.
1 1 9. Compare "Sambo," the idealized exposition of the slave psyche hypothesized by Stanley
Elkins. Elkins viewed slaves as having internalized their circumstances to the point at which they
became not only incapable of resisting the white masters but also actively cooperated in maintaining
their own degradation. See STANLEY M. ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTITU·
TIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE 8 1 - 1 39 (3d ed., 1976).
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movement and decision of free blacks. 1 20 States limited the number of free
blacks who might congregate at one time; 1 2 1 they curtailed the ability of free
blacks to choose their own employment, 1 22 and to trade and socialize with
slaves. 123 Free blacks were subject to question, to search, and to summary

punishment by patrols established to keep the black population, slave and
free, in order. 12• To forestall the possibility that free blacks would rebel
either on their own or with slaves, the southern states limited not only the
right of slaves, but also the right of free blacks , to bear arms. 1 25
The idea was to restrict the availability of arms to blacks, both slave and
free, to the extent consistent with local conceptions of safety. At one extreme
was Texas, which, between 1 842 and 1850, prohibited slaves from using fire
arms altogether. 1 26 Also at this extreme was Mississippi, which forbade fire
arms to both free blacks and slaves after

1 852. 127

At the other extreme was

Kentucky, which merely provided that, should slaves or free blacks "wilfully

and maliciously" shoot at a white person, or otherwise wound a free white
person while attempting to kill another person, the slave or free black would
suffer the death penalty. 1 2s
·

More often than not, slave state statutes restricting black access to firearms
were aimed primarily at free blacks, as opposed to slaves, perhaps because
the vigilant master was presumed capable of denying arms to all but the most
trustworthy slaves, and would give proper supervision to the latter. 1 29 Thus,
1 20. GENOVESE, supra note 97, at 5 1 , 399; STAMPP, supra note 27, at 2 1 5-217; Eugene D. Geno

vese, The Slave States of North America, in

NEITHER SLAVE NOR

FREE: THE FREEDMEN OF AFRI

CAN DESCENT IN THE SLAVE SocIETIES OF THE NEW WORLD 258, 2 6 1 -262 (David w. Cohen &
Jack P. Greene eds., 1972).
1 2 1 . JOHN H. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS
1 39. 40 (6th ed. 1988).
1 22. Id. at 140.

1 2 3. Id. at 140-41.

1 24. STAMPP, supra note 27, at 2 14-16.

1 2 5 . See infra text accompanying notes 1 26- 46.
1 26. An A t Concerning Slaves, § 6, 1840 Laws of Tex. 1 7 1 , 1 72. Chapter 58 of the Texas Acts
�
850
ovided penalties for violators of the 1840 statute. Act of Dec. 3, 1850, ch. 5 8, § l , 1 850
r
w5 0
ex. 42-44 (amending § 6 of An Act Concerning Slaves).
Masters overseers or e mployers
were to be fined between S25 and $ 1 00, and the slave was
to receive not l s than 39 or more than
50 lashes. But also under the 1 850 Act, slaves were allowed
to carry firearms on the premises of the
master, oversrer, or employer, where they presumably
would receive proper supervision.
1 2 7 Act of Mar. 1 5, 1852, ch. 206, 1 852 Laws of
Miss. 328 {prohibiting magistrates from issuing
. cense:i
f�r .bla.c ks to carry and use firearms). This act
h
repealed Chapter 73 sections 1 0 and 1 2 of
the Mississippi Acts of 1822, allowing slaves
and free blacks respectively to btain a license to carry
fire.arm s. See Act of June 18, 1 822, ch. 73,
§§ 1 0, 12, 1 822 Laws of Miss. 179 1 8 1 -82.
1 2 8. Chapter 448 § 1 ofth Ken tuck
Acts of 1 8 1 8 was hm1ted solely to slave offenders. Act of
Y
Feb. 10. 1 8 1 9. ch 448 § 1 1 1 9 Ac ts f K
o
Y 787. The Kentucky Acts of 1850 extended these
�5 1�ns to free blacks as well . Act of Mar. 24,
185 1 , ch. 6 1 7 , art. VII, § 7, 1 850 Acts of K y . 29 1 .
1

�I

r

�

�

·

;

·

'

.

.

·

•

•

�

'

·

f 1fi2 9 · Thi s presumption was not dispositive of all regulati
on

0

·

on this subject. Sale or other deli very

rearms to s!aves was forbidden
bY severaI states, among them Florida, Georgia, Louisi ana. and
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Louisiana provided that a slave was denied the use of firearms and all other
offensive weapons, 1 30 unless the slave carried written permission to hunt
within the boundaries of the owner's plantation. 1 3 1 South Carolina prohib
ited slaves outside the company of whites or without written permission from
their master from using or carrying firearms unless they were hunting or
guarding the master's plantation . 1 32 Georgia, Maryland, and Virginia did
not statutorily address the question of slaves' access to firearms, perhaps be
cause controls inherent to the system made such laws unnecessary in these
states' eyes.
By contrast, free blacks, not under the close s crutiny of whites, were gener
ally subject to tight regulation with respect to firearms. The State of Florida,
provided for a weekly renewable license for slaves to use
firearms to hunt and for "any other necessary and lawful purpose, " 133 turned
which had in

1 824

its attention to the question of free blacks in

1825.

Section

8 of "An

Act to

Govern Patrols"134 provided that white citizen patrols "shall enter into all
negro houses and suspected places, and search for arms and other offensive
or improper weapons, and may lawfully seize and take away all such

arms,

weapons, and ammunition . . . . " By contrast, the following section of that
same statute expanded the conditions under which a slave might carry a fire
arm, a slave might do so under this statute either by means of the weekly
renewable license or if "in the presence of some white person. " 1 3 s
Florida went back and forth on the question of licenses for free blacks 1 3 6
but, i n February

1831

repealed all provision for firearm licenses for free

North Carolina. Act of Feb 25, 1 840, no. 20, § l , 1840 Acts of Fla. 22-23; Act of Dec. 19, 1860, no.
64, § 1, 1 860 Acts of Ga. 561; Act of Apr. 8, 1 8 1 1, ch. 14, 1 8 1 1 Laws ofl,a. 50, 53-54; Act of Jan. 1 ,
1 845 , ch. 87, § § 1 , 2, 1 845 Acts of N.C. 1 24. Moreover, slave states often provided for patrols

man ned by local men who would be authorized to search out and confiscate firearms in the posses
sion of free blacks as well as slaves. See infra text accompanying notes 133-46.

1 30. Black Code, ch. 33, § 19, Laws of La. 150, 160 (1 806).
1 3 1 . Id. § 20. Moreover, in 1 8 1 1 , Louisiana forbade peddlers from selling arms to slaves, upon a
fine of $500 or one year in prison. Act of Apr. 8, 1 8 1 1, ch. 14, 1 8 1 1 Laws of La. 50, 53-54 (supple
menting act relative to peddlers and hawkers).
1 3 2 . Act of Dec. 1 8, 1 8 19, 1 8 1 9 Acts of S.C. 28, 3 1 (providing more effective performance of
patrol duty).
1 3 3 . An Act Concerning Slaves, § 1 1, Acts of Fla. 289, 29 1 ( 1 8 24). In 1 825, Florida had p�o
vided a penalty for slaves using firelight to hunt at night, but this seems to have been a po 1ce
measure intended to preserve wooded land, for whites were also penalized for this offense, albeit a
lesser penalty. Act of Dec. Io, 1 82 5 , § 5, 1 825 Laws of Fla. 78-80. Penalties for "firehunting" were
.
for a slave
reenacted in
1 827, Act of Jan. t , 1 828, 1 828 Laws of Fla. 24-25, and the penalties
firehunting were reenacted in 1 82 8 , Act of Nov. 21, 1 828, § 46, 1 828 Laws of Fla. 1 74, 1 85 .

�

1 34. 1 825 Acts of Fla. 52, 55.

1 3 5. Id.

§ 9.
1 3 6 . In 1 828, Florida twice enacted provisions providing for free blacks to carry and use firearms
upon obtaining a license from a justice of the peace. Act of Nov. 1 7, 1 828, § 9, 1828 Fla. Laws 1 74,
1 7 7 ; Act of Jan. 12, 1828, § 9, 1 82 7 Fla. Laws 97, 100.
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blacks . 1 31 This development predated by six months the Nat Turner slave
revolt in Virginia, which was responsible for the deaths of at least fifty-seven
white people1Js and which caused the legislatures of the Southern states to
reinvigorate their repression of free blacks. 1 39

Among the measures that

slave states took was to further restrict the right to carry and use firearms.
In its December 1 83 1 legislative session, Delaware for the first time required
free blacks desiring to carry fir earms to obtain a license from a justice of the

peace. 140 In their December 1 8 3 1 legislative sessions, both Marylan d 1 4 1 and
Virginia 1 42 entirely prohibited free blacks from carrying arms; Georgia fol
lowed suit in 1833, declaring that "it shall not be lawful for any free person
of colour in this state, to own, use, or carry fire arms of any description
whatever.''1 43
Perhaps as

a

response to the Nat Turner rebellion, Florida in 1 833 enacted

another statute authorizing white citizen patrols to seize arms found in the
homes of slaves and free blacks, and provided that blacks without a proper
explanation for the presence of the firearms be summarily punished, without
benefit of a judicial tribunal.144 In 1846 and 1 86 1 , the Florida legislature
provided once again that white citizen patrols might search the homes of
blacks, both free and slave, and confiscate arms held therein. 145 Yet, search
ing out arms was not the only role of the white citizen patrols: these patrols
were intended to enforce pass systems for both slaves and free blacks, to be
sure that blacks did not possess liquor and other contraband items, and gen
erally to terrorize blacks into accepting their subordination. 1 46 The patrols
would meet no resistance from those who were simply unable to offer any.

31, 1831, 1831 Fla. Laws 30.
58, at 298. For a full account of the revolt the bloodiest in United
293-324. For a compilation of documentary sour�s on the revolt, see also
H F.. N RY l. TRAGLE, THE SoUTHAMPTON SLAVE REVOLT OF EIGHTEEN TH RTY ONE A CoMPI1.ATIO N OF SoURCE MATERIAL (1971). An account of the revolt novelized from Turner's confes
io
be foun� i� WILLIAM STYRON, THE CONFESSIONS OF NAT TURNER (1967). Styron's
.
novel h� been cnltctzed
as failing to capture the power of religion to the 19th century black, and
thus failing to tell the truth of the revolt. See, e.g., WILLIAM
F. CHEE K, BLACK RESISTANCE
BEFO RE THE CIVIL WAR 1 16-17 (1970).
1 39. See HERBERT APTHEKER, NAT TURNER'S SLAVE REBELL ION 74-94 (1966).
140. Id. at 74-75.
141. Id. at 75.
142. Id. at 81.
143. Act of Dec 23, 1833, § 7, 1 833 Ga. Laws 226, 228.
h 144· Act of Feb. 17, 1833, ch. 671,
§§ 15, 17, 1833 Fla. Laws 26 29. The black person o ffendi n g
t e statute was to be "severely pums
hed
incongruously enough "by moderate whippi ng," not to
.
exc eed t h.arty·mne strokes on the
bare back. Id.
§ 17.
1
.
ch
87,
1846
.
Fl a. Laws 42, 44; Act of D ec. 17 , 1 861, ch. 1291 ,
§ I I,
§ �\ :�·��-J�w�· i:,4�
1 8
.
I %. STAM PP, supra note 27, at
214- 15.
1 37.
1 38.

Act of Jan

APTHEKER, supra note
States h istory, see id. at
s

I
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'

·

•

"

·
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B. THE NORTHERN ANTEBELLUM EXPERIENCE: USE OF FIREARMS TO
COMBAT RACIALLY MOTIVATED DEPRIVATIONS OF LIBERTY

Even as northern racism defined itself in part by the curtailment of black
voting rights, 147 it cumulatively amounted to what some have called a wide
spread "Negrophobia. " 148 With notable exceptions, public schooling, if
available to blacks at all, was segregated. 1 49 Statutory and constitutional lim
itations on the freed om of blacks to emigrate into northern states were a

further measure of northern racism . 1 50 While the level of enforcement and
147. See supra text accompanying notes 1 12-16.
1 48 . See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER , GOVERNMENT

BY JUDICIARY:

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 10 ( 1 977).
149. After Roberts

v.

Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 ( 1 849), upheld the provision of segregated

public education in the City of Boston, the Massachusetts legislature outlawed segregated educa
tion. Act of Mar. 24,

1 855,

ch. 256, 1 855 Mass. Acts 256; see Finkelman, supra note 99, at 465-467.

In Connecticut, most schools were integrated before 1830; only in response to a request from the
Hartford black community was a separate system established in that year. Id. at 468. The Iowa
constitution provided for integration in public schools. See Clark

266 ( 1 868) (construing IOWA CONST. of 1857, art.

In

IX,

v.

Board of Directors, 24 Iowa

§ 12).

Ohio, blacks were excluded entirely from public schools until 1834 when the state Supreme

Court ruled that children of mixed black ancestry who were more than half white might attend; not

until 1 848 did the legislature provide for public education of any sort for other black children.
Williams v. Directors of Sch. Dist., Ohio 578 (1834); see also Lane v. Baker, 12 Ohio 237 (1 843). In

1 848, the state legislature allowed blacks to be serviced by the public schools unless whites in the
community were opposed; in the alternative, the legislature provided for segregated education.

Act

of Feb. 24, 1 848, 1848 Ohio Laws 8 1 . The following year, the legislature provided that the choice of
segregated or integraied public education lie at the option of local school districts. Act of Feb. 10,
1 849, 1 849 Ohio Laws 1 7. Cincinnati refused to comply with the mandate to educate blacks until

forced to do so by a combination of statutory and judicial persuasion. Act of Mar. 14, 1853, § 3 1 ,
1 853 Ohio Laws 429; Act of Apr. 1 8, 1 854, 1854 Ohio Laws 48; Act of Apr. 8, 1856, 1 85 6 Ohio

Laws 1 17; State ex rel. Directors of the E. & W. Sch. Dist. v. City of Cincinnati, 19 Ohio 1 78
( 1 8 50); see Finkelman, supra note 99, at 468-470. See generally UNITED STATES OFFICE OF EDU
CATION, HISTORY OF SCHOOLS FOR THE COLORED POPULATION (1 969). In Philadelphia, public
education was provided for whites in 1 8 1 8, and separate education was provided for blacks in 1 822.

Finkelman, supra note 99, at 468. In Providence, public education was segregated. COTTROL,
supra note 1 1 1 , at 90. Rural schools in Rhode Island, however, were integrated. Id. In New York,
some school districts were segregated, among them that of New York City. Finkelman, supra note
99, at 463, 467-68.
1 50. From 1 807 to 1 849, Ohio required blacks entering the state to post a bond. Act of Jan. 25,

1 807, ch. VIII, 1807 Ohio Gen. Assem. Laws 53, repealed by Act of Feb. 10, 1849, 1849 Ohio Laws
1 7. Michigan Territory passed a similar law in 1827, though there was only one r�rded attempt
to enforce it. Act of Apr 13, 1 827, 1827 Mich. Rev. Laws 1 - 1 0 (1st & 2d Councils). DAVID M.
KATZMAN, BEFORE THE GHETTO: BLACK DETROIT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 7 n.6 ( 1 973).

Indiana required a bond from 1 83 1 until 1 8 5 1 , when a new constitution forbade black immigration
enti rely. Act of Feb. 10, 1 8 3 1 , 1 83 1 Ind. Rev. Laws 375, superseded by I ND. CONST. of 1 8 5 1 , art.
X I I I , § 1 (amended 1 8 8 1 ). Illinois went the same route by coupling the repeal of its 1829 bond
provisions with a prohibition on black immigration in its 1 848 constitution. ILL. CONST. of 1 848,
art. XIV; Act of Jan. 1 7, 1 832-33, Ill. Rev. Laws 463, amended by Act of Feb 1, 183 1 , 1832-33 Ill.
Rev. Laws 462, repealed by Act of Feb. 12, 1853, 1853 Ill. Laws 57. Oregon's 1859 constitution
forbade blacks to enter the state, OR. CONST. of 1859, art. XVIII (repealed 1926), and Iowa pro
vided for a fine of two dollars a day for any black remaining in the state for more than three days.
Act of Feb. 5, 1851, 1 8 5 1 Iowa Laws 1 72.
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the ultimate effect of these constitutional and statutory provisions may not
have been great, 1 5 1 the very existence of these laws speaks to the level of
hostility northern whites had for blacks during this period. It is against this
background-if not poisonous, racist and hostile-that the black antebellum
experience with the right to bear arms must be measured.
Perhaps nothing makes this point better than the race riots and mob vio
lence against blacks that occurred in many northern cities in the antebellum
period. These episodes also illustrate the uses to which firearms might be put
in pursuit of self-defense and individual liberty.
A good deal of racial tension was generated by economic competition be
tween whites and blacks during this period, and this tension accounts in part
for violent attacks against blacks. 1 52 Moreover, whites were able to focus
their attacks because blacks were segregated into distinct neighborhoods in
northern states, rendering it easy for white mobs to find the objects of their
hostility. 1 53
Quite often, racial violence made for bloody, destructive confrontations.
In July 1834, mobs in New York attacked churches, homes, and businesses
of white abolitionists and blacks. These mobs were estimated at upwards of
twenty thousand people and required the intervention of the militia to sup
press. 1 54 In Boston in August of 1 843, after a handful of white sailors ver
bally and physically assaulted four blacks who defended themselves, a mob
of several hundred whites attacked and severely beat every black they could
find, dispersed only by the combined efforts of police and fire personnel. 155
The Providence Snowtown Riot of 1 83 1 was precipitated by a fight be
tween whites and blacks at "some houses of ill fame"l56 located in the black
ghetto of Snowtown. After a mob of one hundred or so whites descended on
Snowtown, and after warning shots had been fired, a black man fired into the
crowd, killing a white. The mob then descended on Snowtown in earnest,
destroying no fewer than seventeen black occupied dwellings across a period
of four days. The mobs did not disperse until the militia fired into the crowd,
killing four men and wounding fourteen others. 1 5 1
1 5 1 . From 1 833 to 1 838, Connecticut prohibited the establishment of schools for nonresident
blacks. Act of May 24, 1 833, ch. IX, 1833 Conn. Pub. Acts 425, repealed by Act of May 3 1 , 1 838,
ch. XXXIV, 1838 Conn. Pub. Acts 30; see also Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339 ( 1 834) (attempted
prosecution under this statute failed due to an insufficient information). See Finkelman, supra note
99, at 430-43 (discussing the lack of enforcement of statutes regulating black immigration).
1 52. See LITWACK, supra note 1 1 6, at 1 59, 1 65 (in fields where blacks were
allowed to compete
with whites, who were often the new Irish immigrants, violence often erupted).
1 53. Id. at 1 53; see also LEONARD P. CURRY, THE FREE BLACK
IN URBAN AMERICA 1 8001 850:

THE SHADOW OF THE DREAM 96- 1 1 1 ( 1 98 1).

1 54. CURRY, supra
1 5 5. Id. at 100.
1 56. Id.
1 57. Id.

at
at

102.
102-03.

note

1 53,

at

101.
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Similarly, the militia in Philadelphia put down an October

1849

race riot

that resulted in three deaths, injuries, and the destruction of property. 1 s s By
contrast, in the Providence Hardscrabble Riot of October 1824, militia were
not called out and the police did nothing to stop a crowd of fifty or so whites
from destroying every house in the black Hardscrabble area and looting
household goods. 1 s9
A wareness of racial hostility generally, and of incidents like these, made
blacks desirous of forming militia units.
dence in

1 83 1

The firing of the weapon in Provi

that sparked the mob to violence illustrated that blacks were

willing to take up arms to protect themselves, but also illustrated the poten
tially counterproductive nature of individual action. The actions of the white
militia in Providence and Philadelphia, as well as those of the police and fire
units in Boston, proved the strength of collective armed action against mob
violence. Moreover, the failure of police to take action in Providence in

1 824

illustrated the vulnerability of the black community to mob violence, absent
protection.
Though the Uniform Militia Act of

1792 had not specifically barred blacks

from participation in the state organized militia, 160 the northern states had
treated the act as such, and so the state organized militia was not an op
tion . 161 Blacks could nonetheless form private militia groups that might
serve to protect against racial violence, and did so. Free blacks in Providence
formed the African Greys in 1 821. 1 62 Oscar Handlin tells of an attempt by
black Bostonians in the

1 850s

to form a private militia company. 163 Black

members of the Pittsburgh community had no private militia but nonetheless
took action against a mob expected to riot in April

1 839.

Instead of taking

action on their own, they joined an interracial peacekeeping force proposed
b y the city's mayor, and were able to put a stop to the riot. 164
I t is not clear whether private black militia groups ever marched on a
w h ite mob. But that they may never have been called on to do so may be a

measure of their success.

The story of the July

1 835

Philadelphia riot is

illustrative. Precipitated when a young black man assaulted a white one, the
two day riot ended without resort to military intervention when a rumor
reache d the streets that "fifty to sixty armed and determined black men had

1 5 8. Id. at 104.
1 59. Id. at 102.
1 60. See supra Part l.c.2.
1 6 1 . JACK 0. FONER, BLACKS AND THE MILITARY IN AMERIC AN HISTORY: A NEW PERSPFCTIVE 20-2 1 ( 1 974).
1 62. See CoTTROL, supra note 97, at 63.
1 63 . 0sCA R HANDLIN, BOSTON'S IMMIGRANTS: A STUDY IN ACCULTURATION 175 & n. 1 IO
( 1 9 59) .
1 64. CUR RY, supra note 1 53, at 100; VICTOR ULLMAN, MARTI N R. DELAN Y: THE BEGINN INGS
OF BLA CK NATIONALISM 29-3 1 ( 1 97 1).
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barricaded themselves in a building beyond the police lines. " 16 5
Undoubtedly, the most striking examples of the salutary use of firearms by
blacks in defense of their liberty, and concurrently the disastrous results from
the denial of the right to carry firearms in self-defense, lie in the same inci
dent . In Cincinnati, in September 1841, racial hostility erupted in two nights
of assaults by white mobs of up to

1500 people.

On the first evening, after

destroying property owned by blacks in the business district, mobs descended
upon the black residential section, there to be repulsed by blacks who fired
into the crowd, forcing it out of the area. The crowd returned, however,
bringing with it a six-pound cannon, and the battle ensued. Two whites and
two blacks were killed, and more than a dozen of both races were wounded.
Eventually, the militia took control, but on the next day the blacks were
disarmed at the insistence of whites, and all adult black males were taken
into protective custody. On the second evening, white rioters again assaulted
the black residential district, resulting in more personal injury and property
damage. 1 66
This history shows that if racism in the antebellum period was not limited
to the southern states, neither was racial violence .

Competition with and

hostility toward blacks accounted for this violence in northern states,
whereas the need to maintain slavery and maintain security for the white
population accounted for racial violence in southern states. Another differ
ence between the two regions is that in the southern states blacks did not
have the means to protect themselves, while in northern states, blacks by and
large had access to firearms and were willing to use them.
The

1 841

Cincinnati riot represents the tragic, misguided irony of the

city's authorities who, concerned with the safety of the black population,
chose to disarm and imprison them-chose, in effect, to leave the black pop
ulation of Cincinnati

as

southern authorities left the black population in slave

states, naked to whatever indignities private parties might heap upon them,

�d

dependent on a government either unable or unwilling to protect their

nghts. A � a symbol for the experience of northern blacks protecting them

selves agamst deprivations of liberty, the
those who would shape

1841

riot holds a vital lesson for

the content and meaning of the Fourteenth

Amendment.
Ill. ARMS AND THE POSTBELLUM SOUTHERN ORDER
The end of the Civil War did more than simply bring about the e nd of
1 65.

Cuuv, rupra note 1 53, at IOS-06
.
at 1 07-08'· WENDELL p · DABNEY , CINCINNATl'S
S
COLORED CITIZENS' HISTORICA L O��� �AL' AN D BIOGR�PHICAL
48-55 (Dabney Publishing Co. 1970) (1926); Cincinnati iot,
AT L R EG. (Balt1more), Sept. 1 1,
1 841, at 32.
1 66. Id.

R
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slavery; it brought about a sharpened conflict between two contrasting con
stitutional visions. One vision, largely held by northern Republicans, saw the
former slaves as citizens167 entitled to those rights long deemed as natural
rights in Anglo-American society. Their's was a vision of national citizen
ship and national rights, rights that the federal government had the responsi
bility to secure for the freedmen and, indeed, for all citizens. This vision,
developed during the antislavery struggle and heightened by the Civil War,
caused Republicans of the Civil War and postwar generation to view the
question of federalism and individual rights i n a way that was significantly
different from that of the original framers of the Constitution and Bill of
Rights. If many who debated the original Constitution feared that the newly
created national government could violate long established rights, those who
changed the Constitution in the aftermath of war and slavery had firsthand
experience with states violating fundamental rights. The history of the right
to bear arms is, thus, inextricably linked with the efforts to reconstruct the
nation and bring about a new racial order.
If the northern Republican vision was to bring the former slaves into the
ranks of citizens, the concern of the defeated white South was to preserve

as

much of the antebellum social order as could survive northern victory and
national law. The Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amend
ment 168 abolished slavery; chattel slavery as it existed before the war could
not survive these developments. Still, in the immediate aftermath of the war,
the South was not prepared to accord the general liberties to the newly eman
cipated black population that northern states had allowed their free black
populations. 169 Instead, while recognizing emancipation, southern states im-

1 67. Even during the Civil War, the Lincoln administration and Congress acted on the legal
assumption that free blacks were citizens. Despite Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott that
neither free blacks nor slaves could be citizens, Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (15 How.) 393, 4 1 7
( 1 856), Lincoln's Attorney General Edward Bates issued an opinion in 1 862 declaring that free

blacks were citizens and entitled to be masters of an American vessel. See 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 382,
4 1 3 ( 1 862). That same year, Congress amended the t 792 militia statute, striking out the restriction
of militia membership to white men. See Act of July 17, 1 862, ch. 36' � 12, 12 Sta! . 597, 599.
.
While
motivated by military needs, 1 should be

it could be argued that these measures were in part
!
_
noted that the United States and various states had previously enlisted black troops dunng time of
crisis despite the restrictions in the 1 792 Act. See supra Part I.c.2. Thus, these measures reflected
long standing Republican and antislavery beliefs concerning the itizen hi � of f ee Negroes. See
�
�
�
_
nghts m the antebellum
generally Cottrol, supra note 9 t . For a good discussion of black c1t1zensh1p
North, see generally Finkelman,

supra

note 99.

1 68 . Section 1 . Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section

2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.

1 69. See generally Finkelman, supra note 99.
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posed on the freedmen the legal disabilities of the antebellum free Negro
population. As one North Carolina statute indicated:
All persons of color who are now inhabitants of this state shall be entitled
to the same privileges, and are subject to the same burdens and disabilities,
as by the laws of the state were conferred on, or were attached to, free
persons of color, prior to the ordinance of emancipation, except as the same
may be changed by law. 1 70

In 1 865 and 1 866, southern states passed a series of statutes known as the
black codes. These statutes, which one historian described as "a t wilight
zone between slavery and freedom,"171 were an expression of the South's de
termination to maintain control over the former slaves. Designed in part to
ensure that traditional southern labor arrangements would be preserved,
these codes were attempts " 'to put the state much in the place of the former
master. ' "172 The codes often required blacks to sign labor contracts that
bound black agricultural workers to their employers for a year. 173 Blacks
were forbidden from serving on juries, and could not testify or act as parties
against whites. 174 Vagrancy laws were used to force blacks into labor con
tracts and to limit freedom of movement. 1 1s
As further indication that the former slaves had not yet joined the ranks of
free citizens, southern states passed legislation prohibiting blacks from carry
ing firearms without licenses, a requirement to which whites were not sub
jected. The Louisiana176 and Mississippi1 77 statutes were typical of the
1 70. North Carolina Black Code, ch.

40,

1 866 N.C. Sess. Laws 99, reprinted in

TARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION: POLITICAL, MILITARY,

1 DOCUM E N

SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS,



EDUCA

TIONAL AND INDUSTRIAL, 1 86 5 TO THE PRESENT TIME 291 (Walter L. Fleming, ed.,

1 960)

[hereinafter DocUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION].

1 7 1 . KENNETH STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1 865- 1877, at 80 ( 1 965).

1 72. FONER, supra note 29, at 198 (1 988) (quoting letter from William H. Trescot to James L.
Orr, Dec. 1 3 , 1865, South Carolina's Governor's Papers). Eugene Genovese has quoted an antebel
lum observer who described the free Negro as "a sort of inmate on parole." GENOVESE, supra note
97, at 399.
1 7 3 . FoNER, supra note 29, at 200.
1 74. STAMPP, supra n ote 1 7 1 , at 80.

1 7 5. Id.

1 76: No Negro

who is n�t in the ilita service shall be allowed to carry fire-arms, or any
�
�
kind of wea�ns, w1thm the pansh, without the special permission of his employers, ap
and
b� lhe earest and most convenient chief of patrol. Any one violat
�
ing the prov1s1ons of this section shall forfeit his weapons and pay a fine of five dollars, or
m default of the paym nt of said fine, shall
be forced to work five days on the public road,
�
or suffer corporal pu nish ent as hereinafter provided.

proved

�n�orsed

m

Louisiana Statute of 1 865 • pn·nted Ill
·
·�
1 70. at 280.
1 7 7·

Doc UMENTARY HISTORY

OF RECONSTRUCTION '

supra note

[N]o freedman, free negro or mulatto, not in the military service of the United States

gkovcmment, and not licensed so to do by the board of police of his or her county

shall

· ·
·
ccp or carry fire-arms of any kind • or any
ammunition ' dirk or bowie knife ' and on
.
.
.
·
conv1ct1on thereof in
the countY cou rt sha11 be punished by fine, not exceeding ten dollars,
'

1991]
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restrictions found in the codes . Alabama's 1 78 was even ·harsher.
The restrictions in the black codes caused strong concerns among northern
Republicans. The charge that the South was trying to reinstitute slavery was
frequently made, both in and out of Congress. 1 1 9 The news that the freed
men were being deprived of the right to bear arms was of particular concern
to the champions of Negro citizenship. For them, the right of the black pop
ulation to possess weapons was not merely of symbolic and theoretical im
portance; it was vital both

as

a means of maintaining the recently reunited

Union and a means of preventing virtual reenslavement of those formerly
held in bondage. Faced with a hostile and recalcitrant white South deter
mined to preserve the antebellum social order by legal and extra-legal
means, 1 80 northern Republicans were particularly alarmed at provisions of
the black codes that effectively preserved the right to keep and bear arms for
former Confederates while disarming blacks, the one group in the South with
clear unionist sympathies. 1 8 1 This fed the determination of northern Repub-

and pay the cost of such proceedings, and all such arms or ammunition shall be forfeited
to the informer; and it shall be the duty of every civil and military officer to arrest any
freedman, free negro, or mulatto found with any such arms or ammunition, and cause him
or her to be committed to trial in default of bail.
Mississippi Statute of
note 1 70, at 290.

1 865, reprin ted in DocUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION, supra

1 78.
l. That it shall not be lawful for any freedman, mulatto, or free person of color in this
State, to own fire-arms, or carry about his person a pistol or other deadly weapon.

2.

That after the 20th day of January,

1866,

any person thus offending may be arrested

upon the warrant of any acting justice of the peace, and upon conviction fined any sum
not exceeding

$100

or imprisoned in the county jail, or put to labor on the public works of

any county, incorporated town, city, or village, for any term not exceeding three months.

3.

That if any gun, pistol or other deadly weapon be found in the possession of any

freedman, mulatto or free person of color, the same may by any justice of the peace,
sheriff, or constable be taken from such freedman, mulatto, or free person of color; and if
such person is proved to be the owner thereof, the same shall, upon an order of any justice
of the peace, be sold, and the proceeds thereof paid over to such freedman, mulatto, or
person of color owning the same.

4. That it shall not be lawful for any person to sell, give, or lend fire-arms or ammuni

tion of any description whatever, to any freedman, free negro or mulatto; and any person
so violating the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon convic
tion thereof, shall be fined in the sum of not less than fifty nor more than one hundred
dollars, at the discretion of the jury trying the case.

209 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) .
supra note 1 7 1 , at �0-8 1.
STAMPP,
225-227;
supra
.
tely launched its campaign of terror
immedia
and
866
1
in
formed
The Ku Klux Klan was
against blacks and southern white unionists. See FONER, supra note 29, at 342; infra text at notes
2 1 7 -223.
I 8 1 . During the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1 866, Republican Representative � i�ney

See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDM ENTS' DEBATES

1 79 .
1 80.

See FONER,

note

29,

at

Clarke of Kansas expressed the fears of many northern Republicans who saw the clear m t htary
implications of allowing the newly formed white militias in Southern states to d1sann blacks:
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licans to provide national enforcement of the Bill of Rights. 182
The efforts to disarm the freedmen were in the background when the

39th

Congress debated the Fourteenth Amendment, and played an important part
in convincing the

39th

Congress that traditional notions concerning federal

ism and individual rights needed to change. While a full exploration of the
incorporation controversy 1 83 is beyond the scope of this article, it should be
noted that Jonathan Bingham, author of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privi
leges or Immunities Clause, 1s4 clearly stated that it applied the Bill of Rights
to the states. m Others shared that same understanding. 186
Although the history of the black codes persuaded the
Congress and the federal courts must be

given

39th

Congress that

the authority to protect citi

zens against state deprivations of the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court in its
earliest decisions on the Fourteenth Amendment moved to maintain much of
the structure of prewar federalism. A good deal of the Court's decision-mak-

Who, sir, were those men? Not the present militia; but the brave black soldiers of the
Union, disarmed and robbed by this wicked and despotic order. Nearly every white man
in [Mississippi) that could bear arms was in the rebel ranks. Nearly all of their able
bodied colored men who could reach our lines enlisted under the old ftag. Many of these
brave defenders of the nation paid for their arms with which they went to battle. And I
regret, sir, that justice compels me to say, to the disgrace of the Federal Government, that
the "reconstructed" state authorities of Mississippi were allowed to rob and disarm our
veteran soldiers and arm the rebels fresh from the field of treasonable strife. Sir, the dis
armed loyalists of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana are powerless today, and op
pressed by the pardoned and encouraged rebels of those States.
note 1 78, at 209.
1 82. Representative Roswell Hart, Republican from New York, captured those sentiments during the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866:

T H E RECONSTR UCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra

The Constitution clearly describes that to be a republican form of government for which
was expressly framed. A government which shall "establish justice, insure domestic
tranquillity, �rovide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the
�les.<ungs of liberty"; a government whose "citizens shall be entitled to all privileges and
. of other citizens"; where "no law shall be made
1mmumt1es
prohibiting the free exercise of
religion"; where "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed";
wh� re "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated," and where "no person
shall be deprived o� life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Have these rebellious States such a form of government? If they have not, it is the duty
of t he United States to guaranty that they have it speedily.
.
1t

Ttn: R ECONSTRUCTION AMENDM ENTS' DEBATES, supra note
1 78, at 1 93 .
. 1 8 ): For a good general discussion of the incorporation question, see MICHAEL K. CUR TIS, No
.
s r Al l·. SllAl.1. ARRIDGE: THE FOU RTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE BILL OF RIGHTS ( 1 986). For
.
8 good discussion

of the 39th Congress's views concerning the Second Amendment and its i ncorpo·
see HALBR OOK, supra note 6, at 107-23 .
. 1 84 No state �hall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
.
callzc:n s of the United States; . . . . " U.S. CONST
. amend. XIV, § l .
: :�· ;d""' i����NSTR�CTION AME�DME NTS'
DEBATES, supra note 178, at 1 56-60, 2 1 7- 1 8.
·
.
: a
rcmar s by Republican Sen. Jacob Howard of Michiga
n on privileges and i mmu ·
ntllell of ci ti zens ).
ration

v1�
.

the Fourteenth,
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ing that weakened the effectiveness of the Second Amendment was part of
the Court's overall process of eviscerating the Fourteenth Amendment soon
after its enactment.
That process began with the Slaughterhouse Cases, 1 87 which dealt a severe
blow to the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, a
blow from which it has yet to recover. It was also within its early examina
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Court first heard a claim directly
based on the Second Amendment. Ironically, the party first bringing an alle
gation before the Court concerning a Second Amendment violation was the
federal government. In United States v. Cruikshan k, 1 88 federal officials
brought charges against William Cruikshank and others under the Enforce
ment Act of 1870.189 Cruikshank had been charged with violating the rights
of two black men to peaceably assemble and to bear arms. The Supreme
Court held that the federal government had no power to protect citizens
against private action that deprived them of their constitutional rights. The
Court held that the First and Second Amendments were limitations on Con
gress, not on private individuals and that, for protection against private crim
inal action, the individual was required to look to state governments. 190
The Cruikshank decision, which dealt a serious blow to Congress' ability
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, was part of a larger campaign of the
Court to ignore the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment-to
bring about a revolution in federalism, as well as race relations.191 While the
Court in the late 1 870s and 1 880s was reasonably willing to strike down
instances of state sponsored racial discrimination, 192 it also showed a strong
concern for maintaining state prerogative and a disinclination to carry out
1 87 . Butchers Benevolent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 83
( 1 6 Wall.) 36 ( 1 872).
1 88. 92 U.S. 542 ( 1 876).
1 89. 16 Stat. 140 ( 1 870) (codified as amended at 1 8 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1988)). The relevant

U.S.

passage reads:

That if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise u� n the
public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any prov1s10n of
this act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent to prevent or
.
hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him
by the Constitution or laws of the United States or because of his having exercised the
same, such persons shall be held guilty of a felony . . . .

141
1 90. 9 2 U.S. at 548-59.
1 9 1 . This can also be seen in

Id. at

accom
the Court's reaction to the federal government's first public
m odations statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1875. With much the same re�ning th.e Court held
t h at Congress had no power to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations w1thm states. See
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 ( 1 883).
1 92 . See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1 1 8 U.S. 356, 373 ( 1 8 86) (declaring the admm1strat1on. of a
m u nicipal ordinance discrimi natory); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 ( 1 879) (stnkmg
down a statute prohibiting blacks from serving as jurors).
•

.

.

.

.
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the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to make states re
spect national rights.
This trend was demonstrated in Presser

v.

Illinois, 193 the second case in

which the Court examined the Second Amendment. Presser involved a n Illi
nois statute which prohibited individuals who were not members of the mili
tia from parading with arms. 194 Although Justice William Woods, author of
the majority opinion, noted that the Illinois statute did not infringe upon the
right to keep and bear arms, 19s he nonetheless went on to declare that the
Second Amendment was a limitation on the federal and not the state govern
ments. Curiously enough, Woods's opinion also contended that, despite the
nonapplicability of the Second Amendment to state action, states were for
bidden from disarming their populations because such action would interfere
with the federal government's ability to maintain the sedentary militia. 196
With its view that the statute restricting armed parading did not interfere
with the right to keep and bear arms, and its view that Congress's militia
power prevented the states from disarming its citizens, the Presser Court had
gone out of its way in dicta to reaffirm the old federalism and to reject the
framers' view of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Bill of Rights applied
to the states.
The rest of the story is all too well known. The Court's denial of an ex
panded roll for the federal government in enforcing civil rights played a cru
cial role in redeeming white rule. The doctrine in Cruikshank, that blacks
would have to look to state government for protection against criminal con
spiracies, gave the green light to private forces, often with the assistance of
state and local governments, that sought to subjugate the former slaves and
their descendants. Private violence was instrumental in driving blacks from
the ranks of voters. 197 It helped force many blacks into peonage, a virtual
ret urn to slavery, 198 and was used to force many blacks into a state of ritual
ized subservience. 199 With the protective arm of the federal government
withdrawn, protection of black lives and property was left to largely hostile
state governments. In the Jim Crow era that would follow, the right to
poss � arms

seen
193.

m

�ould

take on critical importance for many blacks. This right,

the eighteenth century as a mechanism that enabled a majority to

1 1 6 U.S. 252 ( 1 886).

I 94. Id. at 253.
1 9 5 . Id. at 265.
1 96. Id.
1 97 . R A Rl f. , supra note 29, at 88-90; STAMP
P, supra note 1 7 1 , at 1 99-204.
I 9R. Benno C. Schmidt • Jr • Pr
mcipIe and pre1u
· dice:
·
"
The Supreme Court and Race in the Progres.
�rri. p,a rt 2: The Peonage Cases
u� E
, 82 COLU M. l. REV. 646 6 5 3-55 ( 1 982)
'
1 99 . Gf.OR GE M FREDR ICKSON W HITE
S UPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN A M E RICA N
ANI> SoUTH A t'RICAN HISTORY
25 1 5 2 ( 1 98 1 ) · C HARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL V I O L E NCE ,
C R I M I N A i . J USTICE 32 ( 1 978)- J
OE L WILLIAMSON, A RAGE FOR ORD E R : BLACK/WH IT E R EL A
·
TlONS IN THE. AM�R IC A N SOUTH S INCE
EMANCIPATION 124 ( 1 9 86).
.

·

.

.

.

•

.

-

•

•
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check the excesses of a potentially tyrannical national government, would for
many blacks in the t wentieth century become a means of survival in the face
of private violence and state indifference.
IV. ARMS AND AFRO-AMERICAN SELF-DEFENSE IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY: A HISTORY IGNORED

For much of the twentieth century, the black experience in this country
has been one of repression. This repression has not been limited to the south
ern part of the country, nor is it a development divorced from the past. Born
perhaps of cultural predisposition against blacks,200 and nurtured by eco
nomic competition between blacks and whites, particularly immigrant
groups and those whites at the lower rungs of the economic scale,20 1 racism
in the North continued after the Civil War, abated but not eliminated in its
effects. 202 In the South, defeat in the Civil War and the loss of slaves as
property confirmed white Southerners in their determination to degrade and
dominate their black brethren. 203
Immediately after the Civil War and the emancipation it brought, white
Southerners adopted measures to keep the black population in its place. 204
Southerners saw how Northerners had utilized segregation as a means to
avoid the black presence in their lives,20s and they already had experience
with segregation in southern cities before the war.206 Southerners extended
this experience of segregation to the whole of southern life through the mech
anism of "Jim Crow ." 2o7 Jim Crow was established both by the operation of
200. See generally JORDAN, supra note 56, at 3-43.
201 . LITWACK, supra note 1 16, at 1 53-86.
202. Cottrol, supra note 9 1 , at 1007-19.
203. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 22·23 (3d ed. 1974).
2 04. See infra text accompanying notes 169-178. See generally WOODWARD, supra note 203, at
2 2-29.
205. See id. at 18-2 1 (the Jim Crow system was born in the North where systematic segregation,
with the backing of legal and extralegal codes, penneated black life in the free stales by 1 860); see
also LITWACK, supra note 1 1 6, at 97-99 (in addition to statutes and customs that limited the polit
ical and judicial rights of blacks, extralegal codes enforced by public opinion perpetuated the
North's systematic segregation of blacks from whites).
206. See RICHARD c. WADE, SLAVERY IN THE CITI ES: THE SoUTH 1 820-1 860, at 1 80-208
( 1 964) (although more contact between blacks and whites occurred in urban areas of the South,
both social standards and a legal blueprint continued the subjugation of blacks to whites).
207. See generally WOODWARD, supra note 204. Jim Crow has been said to have established
an etiquette of discrimination. It was not enough for blacks to be second class citizens.
denied the franchise and consigned to inferior schools. Black subordination was rein
forced by a racist punctilio dictating separate seating on public accommodat �ons, separate
water fountains and restrooms, separate seats in courthouses, and separate Bibles to swear
in black witnesses about to give testimony before the Jaw. The list of separations was
ingenious and endless. Blacks became like a group of American untouchables, ritually
sepa rated from the rest of the population.
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law, including the black c odes and other legislation, and by an elaborate eti
quette of racially restrictive social practices. The Civil Rights Cases 208 and

Plessy v. Ferguson 209 gave the South freedom to pursue the task of separating
black from white. The Civil Rights Cases went beyond Cru ikshan k, even
more severely restricting congressional power to provide for the equality of
blacks under Section 5 o f the Fourteenth Amendment,210 and Plessy v. Fergu 
son declared separate facilities for blacks and whites to be consonant with the
Fourteenth Amendment's mandate of "equal protection of the laws . , ,2 1 1 In
effect, states and individuals were given full freedom to effect their "social
prejudices"2 1 2 and "racia l instincts"2 13 to the detriment of blacks throughout
the South and elsewhere.214
These laws and customs were given support and gruesome effect by vio
lence. In northern cities, violence continued to threaten blacks after Recon
struction and after the tum of the century.

For instance, in New York,

hostility between blacks and immigrant whites ran high.21s Negro strike
breakers were often used t o break strikes of union workers.216

Regular

clashes occurred between blacks and the Irish throughout the nineteenth cen
tury, 2 1 7 until finally a major race riot broke in 1 900 that lasted four days. 2 1 8
Diamond & Cottrol, supra note 103, at 264-65 (footnote omitted).
208. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

209. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2 10. 109 U.S. 3.

2 1 1 . 163 U.S. at 548.
2 1 2. Id. at 551.
2 1 3. Id.
2 14. Jim Crow was not exclusively a southern experience after the Civil War. For example, at

one point or another, antimiscegenation laws have been enacted by forty-one of the fifty states.
Harvey

M. Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Problem, 5 3 GEO.

LJ.

49, 50- 1 & 5o � -9 (1 964). The Adams case, in which the federal government challenged separate
_
. .
unaverstty fac1ht1cs throughout the union, involved the State of Pennsylvania. See Adams v. Rich

�

ardson, 356 F. Supp. 92, 100 (D.D.C. 1973); Adams v. Richardson, 3 5 1 F. Supp. 636, 637
19!2>

Hansberry v.

(D . D.C.
Lee, 3 1 1 U.S. 32 (1940), involved a covenan t restricting the sale of property in

:
llh nois to blacks. The set of consolidated cases that outlawed the separate but equal doctrine would

later be kno � n as Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 ( 1 954), the defendant board of education
was located tn Kansas, a Northern state.
2 ! 5. GILBERT 0soFSKY, HARLEM: THE MAKING OF A GHETTO: NEGRO NEW YORK 18901 9 30, at 46-52 ( 1 963).
2 16. Id. at 42.

2 1 7 . Id. at 45- 46.
2 1 8 . Id. at 46-52.

After the riot ended, the situation nevertheless remained tense. Negroes began to arm.
Revolvers and other wcapo ns were east· 1Y purchased
at local pawnshops and hard ware
In a survey made of [the area where the riot took place], just
one day after the riot,
as fiound that 145 revolvers and a substantial amount of ammuni
tion had been sold
.. a! l had gone
to negrocs " LIoyd w·11·
1 tams, a Negro bartender was seen leaving one store
·
.
.
.
wit h an arsenal of weapons When asked w at
h he was gomg to do with them, he replied,
.
"I underst
d
an
they , re knockmg down negroes 'round here. The
h.
first man tries it o n me
gets t ts . . . . .. Other Negroes wamed
that no wh'tte men were going to bother them. As

:::es.

'

·
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And i n

19 19,

38

after a Chicago race riot,

351

deaths and

537

injuries were re

ported as a result of attacks on the black population.219
In the South, racism found expression, not only through the power of un
organized mobs, but also under the auspices of organized groups like the Ku

1866 as

Klux Klan. The Klan started in

a social organization of white Civil

War veterans in Pulaski, Tennessee,220 complete with pageantry, ritual, and
opportunity for plain and innocent amusement.22 1 But the group soon ex
panded and turned its attention to more sinister activities. The Klan' s activi
ties, primarily in the South, expanded to playing tricks on blacks and then to
terroristic nightriding against them . 222 The Ku Klux Klan in this first incar
nation was disbanded, possibly
May

1 870.223

as

early

as

January

1 868,

and no later than

By that time, the Klan's activities had come to include as

saults, murder, lynchings, and political repression against blacks, 22• and
Klan-like activities would continue and contribute to the outcome of the fed
eral election of

1 876

that ended Reconstruction.22� As one author has put it,

"The Invisible Empire faded away, not because it had been defeated, but

because it had won. " 22 6

The Ku Klux Klan would be revived in
Griffith's film

Birth of a Nation, 227 but,

1915

after the release of D.W.

both pre- and post-dating the Klan's

revival, Klan tactics would play a familiar role in the lives of black people in
the South; for up to the time of the modern civil rights movement, lynching
would be virtually an everyday occurrence. Between

1 882

and

1968, 4,743

policemen patrolled the Negro blocks they were showered with bricks, bottles, and gar
bage, thrown from rooftops and tenement windows. They fired back wilh revol vers

.

It

seems miraculous that n o one was killed.
Id. at 49- 50.
2 1 9. CHICAGO COMM ISSION OF RACE RELATIONS, THE NEORO IN CHICAGO: A STUl>Y 01'
RAC" RELATIONS AND A RACE RIOT ( 1 922) 595-98, 602. 640- 49, rrpriflttd in THF. NF.ORO ANI>
THF.. CITY 1 26-33 (Richard B. Sherman ed . 1970). After World War I, an outbreak of racial vio
.

lence against blacks was recorded from 1 9 1 7 to 1 92 1 . Riots occ urred in Chicago, Omaha. Washing
ton , D.C

..

and East St. Louis, Illinois. Id. at 1 26.

220. WYN CRAIG WADE, T H E FIERY CROSS: THE Ku KLUX Kt.AN IN AMF.RICA 33 ( I 987).
22 1 . Id. at 33-35.
222 . Id. at 37.
223 . STANLEY f. HORN, I N V ISIBLE EMPIRE: THE STORY OF THE Ku Kt.UX Kl.AN 1 866- 1 8 7 1 .
a t 3 5 6- 59 ( 1 969).
224. See geflera/ly WILLIAM L. KATZ, THE INVISIBLE EMPSRE: THE Ku K 1 .ux Kt.AN I M P An

ON H ISTORY 19-59 ( 1 986).

225. See WADE, supra note 220, at 57, 1 10. 1 1 . Through the intimidalion of black vo1cn. the
Democratic party in the Sou th, w i l h which mosl Klansmen were affilialcd, recovered. and Repuhli·
can strength waned. The Democrats captured the House of Representatives in 1 874, and with the
con t rove rsial compromise between Dcmocrals and Republicans thal elevated Rutherford B. Hay�
to the Presidency in 1 877, the end of Reconstruction was marked. Id.
226. KATZ, supra note 224, at 58.
227. WADE, supra note 220, at 1 20.
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persons were lynched, the overwhelming number of these in the South;228
3,446 of these persons were black, 229 killed for the most part for being ac
cused in one respect or another of not knowing their place. 2 30 These accusa
tions were as widely disparate as arson, 2 3 1 theft, 232 sexual contact or even
being too familiar with a white woman, 2 33 murdering or assaulting a white
person, 2 34 hindering a lynch mob, 2 35 protecting one's legal rights, 2 36 not
228. STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL 5
(1 988).
229. Id.
230. NATIONAL Ass'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, THIRTY YEARS OF
LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1889-1918 ( 1 919) reported as follows:
Among colored victims [of lynching],
cent of rape and "attacks upon women"

35.8 per cent were accused of murder; 28.4 per
(19 per cent of rape and 9.4 per cent of "attacks

upon women");

17.8 per cent of crimes against the person (other than those already men
12 per cent were charged with miscellaneous crimes and in
5.6 per cent no crime was charged. The 5.6 per cent. [sic] classified under "Absence of

tioned) and against property;

Crime" does not include a number of cases in which crime was alleged but in which it was
afterwards shown conclusively that no crime had been committed.

Id. at 10.
231. See, e.g., Negro and Wife Hanged, Suspected of Barn-Burning, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Nov. 26, 1914, reprinted in RALPH GINZBURG, 100 YEARS OF LYNCHINGS 92 ( 1988).
232. See, e.g., Negro Hanged as Mule Thief. ATLANTA CONST., July 15, 1914, reprinted in GINZ·
BURG, supra note 231, at 92; Would be Chicken Thief. N.Y. HERALD, Dec. 6, 1 9 14, reprinted in
GINZBURG, supra note 231 , at 93 (reporting a black man having been lynched "[fjor the crime of
crawling under the house of a white citizen, with the intention of stealing chickens").

233. See, e.g., WHITFIELD, supra note 228 (Emmett Till was killed in 1955 because he was
thought to have whistled at a white woman).
are JAMES

R.

Other major works describing individual lynchings

McGOVERN, ANATOMY OF A LYNCHING: THE KILLING OF CLAUDE NEAL

(1982)
1934 occasioned by the rape of a white woman); HOWARD SMEAD,
BLOOD JUSTICE: THE LYNCHING OF MACK CHARLES PARKER (1 986) (describing another lynch
ing of a black man for the rape of a white woman). See also Blacks Lynched for Remark Which
May Have Been 'Hello, ' PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 3, 1 9 1 6, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1, at
98; Inter-Racial Love Affair Ended by Lynching of Man, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Jan. 14, 1922,
reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1, at 1 58; Negro A mbushed, Lynched/or Writing White Girl,
MEMPHIS CoM. APPEAL, Nov. 26, 1921, reprinted in Ginzburg, supra note 2 3 1 , at 1 56; Negro
Insults White Women; Is Shot and Strung Up, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Oct. 10, 19 16, re
printed in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1, at 1 1 1 ; Negro Shot· Dead for Kissing His White Girlfriend,
CHI. DEFENDER, Feb. 3 1 , 1915, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1 , at 95; Negro Youth Muti
lated for Kissing White Girl, BoSTON GUARDIAN, Apr. 30, 1 914, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra
note 231, at 90; White Girl Is Jailed, Negro Friend Is Lynched, GALVESTON TRIB. (Texas), June 21,
1934, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1 , at 2 1 7.
234. See, e.g., Hoosiers Hang Negro Killer, CHI. REC., Feb. 27, 1901, reprinted in G1NZBURG,
supra note 23 1 , at 37; Negro and White Scuffle, Negro Is Jailed, Lynched, ATLANTA CONST., July 6,
1933, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 231, at 197; Negro Shot After Striking Merchant Who
Dirtied Him, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Aug. 28, 1 9 1 3, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 231,
at 88; Negro Suspected of Slaying Bartender Is Hung by Mob, KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 3 1 , 1899,
reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1, at 23.
235. See, e.g., Negro Father is Lynched; Aided Son to Escape Mob, BALT. AFRO-AM., July 6,
1923, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1, at 170.
236. See, e.g., Miss. Minister Lynched, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Aug. 26, 1 944, reprinted in
(describing a lynching in

199 1]

THE SECOND AMENDMENT

353

showing proper respect, 237 or simply being in the wrong place at the wrong
time.238
This is not to say that blacks went quietly or tearfully to their deaths.
Oftentimes they were able to use firearms to defend themselves, though usu
ally not with success: Jim Mcllherron was lynched in Estell Springs, Tennes
see, after having exchanged over one thousand rounds with his pursuers. 239
The attitude of individuals such as Mcllherron is summed up by Ida B.
Wells-Barnett, a black antilynching activist who wrote of her decision to
carry a pistol :
I had been warned repeatedly by my own people that something would

happen if I did not cease harping on the lynching of three months before
. . . . I had bought a pistol the first thing after [the lynching], because I

expected some cowardly retaliation from the lynchers. I felt that one had

better die fighting against injustice than to die like a dog or a rat in a trap.

I had already determined to sell my life as dearly

as

possible if attacked. I

felt if I could take one lyncher with me, this would even up the score a little
bit.240

When blacks used firearms to protect their rights, they were often partially
successful but were ultimately doomed.
GINZBURG, supra note
in

a

231,

In

1 920,

236 (reporting the lynching

at

two black men in Texas

of a black man for having hired a lawyer

property dispute).

237.

See, e.g.. Impertinent Question. BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Sept.

RURG, supra note

231,

at

88

23, 1913,

reprinted in G I NZ

(relating that a black man was lynched after he asked whether a white

23, 1 9 1 3, re
23 1, at 89 (relating that a black man was lynched for having made

woman's husband was home); Insulting Remark, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Oct.
printed in GINZBURG, supra note

an insulting remark to a white woman); Negro Half- Wit is Lynched; Threatened to Lynch Whites.
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER,

Aug. 25, 1913, reprinted in

GINZBURG, supra note

23 1,

Insu lts White Women; Is Shot and Strung Up. MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Oct.
printed in GINZBURG, supra note
LANTA CONST., May

238.

23 1,

at

1 1 1;

Train Porter Lynched After Insult to Woman. AT
,

231, at 3 1 ;

2 3 1, at 130.
1 1 , 1900, reprinted in

reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note

See, e.g., An Innocent Man Lynched, N.Y. TI MES June

supra note

1 92 1 ,

9, 1 920,

at 87; Negro
10, 1 9 1 6, re

GINZBURG,

Boy Lynched at McGhee for No Special Cause. ST. LoUis ARGUS, May

reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note

231,

27,

at I 50; Negro Suspect Eludes Mob; Sister Lynched

Instead, N.Y. TRIB., Mar. 1 7, 1 901, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1, at
Innocent Man When Th warted in Its Hunt, WILMINGTON ADVOC., Dec. 16,

231,

38; Posse Lynches
1922, reprinted in
Nov. 22, 1 895. re

1 66; Texans lynch Wrong Negro. CHI. TRIB.,
23 1, at 9; Thwarted Mob Lynches Brother of Intended Victim.
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER , Aug. 5, 1 9 1 1, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 231. at 73.
239. Blood-Curdling Lynching Witnessed by 2, 000 Persons. CHATIANOOGA TIMES, Feb. 13,
1 9 1 8, reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note 23 1, 1 14- 1 1 6.
240. IDA B. WELLS-BARNETI, CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF IDA 8.
WELLS 62 (Alfreda M. Duster ed., 1 970). Wells-Barnett's fears for her safety, fortunately, were
never realized. Born a slave in 1 862, she died of natural causes in 1931. Id. at xxx-xui. 7. Eli
GINZBURG, supra note

at

printed in GINZBURG, supra note

Cooper of Caldwell, Georgia was not so lucky, however. Cooper was alleged to have said that the
'' Negro has been run over fo r fifty years, but it must stop now. and pistols and shotguns are the only

weapons to stop a mob." Cooper was dragged from his home by a mob of 20 men and killed as his
wife looked on. Ch urch Burnings Follow Negro Agitator's Lynching, Cm. DEFENDER, Sept.
reprinted in GINZBURG, supra note

23 1,

at

124.

6, 1 9 1 9.
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fired on and killed two whites in self-defense. The black men were arrested
and soon lynched.24 1 When the sheriff of Aiken, South Carolina, came with
three deputies to a black household to attempt a warrantless search and
struck one female family member, three other family members used a hatchet
and firearms in self-defense, killing the sheriff. The three wounded survivors
were taken into custody, and after one was acquitted of murdering the sher
iff, with indications of a similar verdict for the other two, all three were
lynched. 242
Although individual efforts of blacks to halt violence to their persons or
property were largely unsuccessful, there were times that blacks succeeded
through concerted or group activity in halting l ynchings. In her autobiogra
phy, Ida Wells-Barnett reported an incident in Memphis in 1 89 1 in which a
black militia unit for two or three nights guarded approximately 1 00 jailed
blacks who were deemed at risk of mob violence. When it seemed the crisis
had passed, the militia unit ceased its work. It was only after the militia unit
left that a white mob stormed the jail and lynched three black inmates. 243
A. Philip Randolph, the longtime head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car
Porters, and Walter White, onetime executive secretary of the National As
sociation for the Advancement of Colored People, vividly recalled incidents
in which their fathers had participated in collective efforts to use firearms to
successfully forestall lynchings and other mob violence. As a thirteen-year
old, White participated in his father's experiences,244 which, he reported, left
him "gripped by the knowledge of my own identity, and in the depths of my
soul, I was vaguely aware that I was glad of it. "245 After his father stood
a �ed at a jail all night to ward off lynchers, 2 46 Randolph was left with a

v1s1on, not "of powerlessness, but of the 'possibilities of salvation,' which re
sided in unity and organization. "247
The

�illingness of blacks to use firearms to protect their rights,

their lives,

and th�1r property, alongside their ability to d o so successfully when acting

c �llect1vely, renders many gun control statutes, particularly of Southern ori

gm, all the more worthy of condemnation. This is especially so in view of the

�

2 1 . l�tter from Texas Reveals Lynching's Ironic
Facts, N.Y. NEGRO WORLD, Aug. 22, 1920,
reprmted in GtNZBURG, supra note 2 3 1 , at
139·40.
242· Lo�e Su�fror of Atrocity Recounts
Events of Lynching, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, June I ,
1 927, repnnted Ill G !N ZBURG, supra
note 23 1 , at 1 75-78 .
. .
243. WELLS·BARNEIT supra note
240 at 50. To forestall the occurrence of future mc1dents of
·
t he same nature' a Tennessee court ordered h
t e local shenff to take charge of the arms of the black
.1. .
.
mt Ilia unit. Id.
•

244.

W AlTER WHITE '

•

A

.

MAN CALLED WHITE 4- 1 2 ( 1 948)'

CITY supra note 2 1 9, at 1 2 1 -26.
24S. Id. at 126.
246. JERV IS ANDERSON '
A . pHILLIP RAN DOLPH : A
247 . ld. at 42.
•

reprinted in THE NEGRO AND THE

BIOGRA PHICAL PORTRAIT 4 1 - 42 ( 1 973).
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purpose of these statutes, which, like that of the gun control statutes of the
,
black codes, was to disarm blacks.
This purpose has been recognized by some state judges.

The Florida

Supreme Court i n 1 94 1 refused to extend a statute forbidding the carrying of
a pistol on one's person to a situation in which the pistol was found in an

automobile glove compartment. 248 In a concurrence, one judge spoke of the
purpose of the statute:
I know something of the history of this legislation. The original Act of
1 893 was passed when there was a great influx of negro laborers in this
State drawn here for the purpose of working in the turpentine and lumber
camps. The same condition existed when the Act was amended in 1 901
and the Act was passed fo r the purpose o f disarming the negro laborers and
to thereby reduce the unlawful homicides that were prevalent in turpentine
and saw-mill camps and to give the white citizens in sparsely settled ares a
better feeling of security. The statute was never intended to be applied to
the white population and in practice has never been so applied.249

The Ohio Supreme Court in 1 920 construed the state's constitutional right
of the people "to bear arms for their defense and security" not to forbid a
statute outlawing the carrying of a concealed weapon. 250

In so doing, the

court followed the lead of sister courts in Alabama,25 1 Arkansas,252 Geor
gia,253 and Kentucky,254 over the objections of a dissenting judge who recog
nized that "the race issue [in Southern states] has intensified

a

decisive

purpose to entirely disarm the negro, and this policy is evident upon reading
the opinions. "255
That the Southern states did not prohibit firearms ownership outright is
fortuitous. During the 1 960s, while many blacks and white civil rights work
ers were threatened and even murdered by whites with guns, firearms in the
hands of blacks served a useful purpose, to protect civil rights workers and
blacks from white mob and terrorist activity . 2 56
While the rate of lynchings in the South had slowed somewhat,257 it was
still clear by 1960 that Southerners were capable of murderous violence in
248. Watson

v.

250. State

Nieto, 1 30

Stone, 4 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1941).

249. Id. at 703 (Buford, J . , concurring).
v.

25 1 . Dunston

252. Carroll
253. Brown

v.

v.
v.

N.E.

663 (Ohio 1920).

State, 27 So. 333 (Ala.

1900).

State, 28 Ark. 99 ( 1 872).

State, 39 S.E. 873 (Ga. 1901).

254. Commonwealth v . Walker, 7 Ky. L. Rptr. 2 1 9 ( 1 885) (abstract).
255. Nieto, 130 N.E. at 669 (Wanamaker, J., dissenting).
256. See, e.g. , John R. Salter, Jr. & Donald B. Kates, Jr., The Necessity ofAcce5! to Firearms by
Dissenters and Minorities Whom Government is Unwilling or Unable to Protect, m RESTRICTING
HAN DGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT, 185, 1 89-93 (Donald B. Kates, Jr. ed., 1 979).
257. According to records kept by the Tuskeegee Institute, 4,733 lynchings occurred between
1 882 and 1 959. 4, 733 Mob Action Victims Since '82, Tuskeegee Reports, MONTGOMERY ADVER-
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pursuit of the Southern way of life. The 1 955 murder of Emmett Till, a
fourteen-year-old boy killed in Money, Mississippi for wolf-whistling at a
white woman, sent shock waves throughout the nation. 258 Two years later,

the nation again would be shocked, this time by a riotous crowd outside
Little Rock's Central High School bent on preventing nine black children
from integrating the school under federal court order; President Eisenhower
ordered federal troops to effectuate the court order. 2 59 News of yet another
prominent lynching in Mississippi reached the public in 1 959 .260

In the early 1960s, Freedom Riders and protesters at sit-ins were attacked,

and some suffered permanent damage at the hands of white supremacists. 2 6 1
In 1 963, Medgar Evers, Mississippi secretary of the NAACP was killed. 262
Three college students were killed in Mississippi during the 1964 "Freedom
Summer"; this killing would render their names-Andrew Goodman, James
Chaney, and Michael Schwerner-and their sacrifice part of the public do
main. 26 3 A church bombing in Birmingham that killed four small black chil
dren, 2 64 the killing of a young white housewife helping with the march from
Montgomery to Selma, 2 65 and the destructive riot in Oxford, Mississippi, 266
that left two dead when James Meredith entered the University of Missis
sippi helped make clear to the nation what blacks in the South had long
known: white Southerners were willing to use weapons of violence, modern
equivalents of rope and faggot, to keep blacks in their place.
It struck many, then, as the height of blindness, confidence, courage, or
moral certainty for the civil rights movement t o adopt nonviolence as its
credo, and to thus leave its adherents open to attack by terrorist elements
within the white South. Yet, while nonviolence had its adherents among the
mainstream civil rights organizations, many ordinary black people in the
South believed in resistance and believed in the necessity of maintaining fire
arms for personal protection, and these people lent their assistance and their
TISER, April 26, 1959, reprinted in GlNZBURG, supra note 2 3 1 , at 244. Tuskeegee Institute's
records show only ten more lynchings to have occurred by 1968. WHITFIEL
D, supra note 228, at 5.
258. See W HITFIELD, supra note 228, at 23-108; see also Eyes on the Prize: America 's Civil Rights
Yea rs. 1 954-1965: A wakenings (1954-56) (PBS television broadcast,
Jan. 2 1 , 1986).

259. See Cooper

v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I ( 1 9 58); see also TONY A.
FREYER, THE LITrLE ROCK
A CoNSTITU tONAL IN ERPRETATION ( 1984); Raymon
d T. Diamond, Confron tation as
_
to Compromise: Reflections on the little Rock Desegreg
R e1oinder
ation Crisis, 1 1 NAT'L BLACK L.J.
1 5 1 . 1 52- 1 64 ( 1 989); yes on the Prize: America 's Civil Rights
Years, 1954-1965: Fighting Back
. on Broadcast,
(/ 95 7-62) (PBS tclcv1s1
Jan. 28, 1986).
260. See generally SM EAD, supra note 233.
C R_1s 1s:

�

�

�

26 1 . RHON DA BLUM BERG, CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
1960s FREEDOM STRUGGLE
262. C I V I i . RIGHTS: 1 960-66 1 90-9 1 (Lester A.
Sobel ed. , 1 967).
2 63. Id. at 244-46.
264. Id. at 1 8 7-88.

2 6 5 . Id. at 303-0S.

266. Id. at 1 1 0- 1 8 .

65-8 1 ( 1 98 4).
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protection to the civil rights movement. 261
Daisy Bates, the leader of the Little Rock NAACP during the desegreg
a
tion crisis, wrote in her memoirs that armed volunteers stood guard over her

home. 268 Moreover, there are oral histories of such assistance . David Den
nis, the black Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) worker who had been
targeted for the fate that actually befell Goodman, Schwemer, and Chaney

during the Freedom Summer,269 has told of black Mississippi citizens with
firearms who followed civil rights workers in order to keep them safe. 210
Ad hoc efforts were not the sole means by which black Southern adherents
of firearms protected workers in the civil rights movement. The Deacons for

Defense and Justice were organized first in 1964 in Jonesboro, Louisiana, but
received prominence in Bogalousa, Louisiana.271 The Deacons organized in

Jonesboro after their founder saw the Ku Klux Klan marching in the street
and realized that the "fight against racial injustice include[d] not one but two
foes: White reactionaries and police. "272 Jonesboro's Deacons obtained a
charter and weapons, and vowed to shoot back if fired upon. 273 The word
spread throughout the South, but most significantly to Bogalousa, where the

267. Donald B. Kates, Jr., recalls that:
As a civil rights worker in a Southern State during the early l 960's, I found that the
possession of firearms for self-defense was almost universally endorsed by the black com
munity, for it could not depend on police protection from the KKK. The leading civil
rights lawyer in the state (then and now a nationally prominent figure) went nowhere
without a revolver on his person or in his briefcase. The black lawyer for whom I worked
principally did not carry a gun all the time, but he attributed the relative quiescence of the
Klan to the fact that the black community was so heavily armed. Everyone remembered
an incident several years before, in which the state's Klansmen attempted to break up a
civil rights meeting and were routed by return gunfire. When one of our clients (a school
teacher who had been fired for her leadership in the Movement) was threatened by the
Klan, I joined the group that stood armed vigil outside her house nightly. No attack ever
came-though the Klan certainly knew that the police would have done nothing to hinder
or punish them.
R ESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT, supra note 256, at 1 86.
268. DAISY BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF LITTLE ROCK, A M EMOI R 94 ( 1982).
269. HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL IS RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH
REME MBER ED 275-76 ( 1 977).

270. Telephone interview with David Dennis (Oct. 30, 1 9 9 1 ) .
271. Hamilton Bims, Deacons/or Defense, EBONY, Sept. 1 965, at 25, 26; see also Roy Reed, The
Deacons, Too, Ride by Night, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1 5, 1965, Magazine, at 10.
272. Bims, supra note 2 7 1 , at 25-26.
.
273. Id. at 26. Like the Deacons for Defense and Justice was the Monroe, North Carolina chap

ter of the NAACP, which acquired firearms and used them to deal with the Ku Klux Klan. ROB·
ERT F. WILLIAMS, NEGROES WITH GUNS 42-49, 54-57 ( 1 962). The Deacons for Defense and
Just ice are to be contrasted with the Black Panther Party for Self Defense. The Black Panther
Program included the following statement:

�

We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by �rganizing b ack sc:tf
defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black commu�1ty .from racist pohcc
.
of the Umted
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Klan was rumored to have its largest per capita membership.274 There, a
local chapter of the Deacons would grow to include "about a tenth of the
Negro adult male population,'' or about

900

members, although the organi

zation was deliberately secretive about exact numbers. 275 What is known,
however, is that in

1965

there were fifty to sixty chapters across Louisiana,

Mississippi, and Alabama. 276 In Bogalousa, as elsewhere, the Deacons' job
was to protect black people from violence, and they did so by extending vio
lence to anyone who attacked.277

This capability and willingness to use

force to protect blacks provided a deterrent to white terroristic activity.
A prime example of how the Deacons accomplished their task lies in the
experience of James Farmer, then head of (CORE), a frontline, mainstream
civil rights group. Before Farmer left on a trip for Bogalousa, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation informed him that he had received a death threat
from the Klan. The FBI apparently also informed the state police, who met
Farmer at the airport. But at the airport also were representatives of the
Bogalousa chapter of the Deacons, who escorted Farmer to the town.
Farmer stayed with the local head of the Deacons, and the Deacons provided
close security throughout the rest of this stay and Farmer's next.

Farmer

later wrote in his autobiography that he was secure with the Deacons, "in the
knowledge that unless a bomb were tossed . . . the Klan could only reach me
if they were prepared to swap their lives for mine. " 278
Blacks in the South found the Deacons helpful because they were unable
to rely upon police or other legal entities for racial justice. This provided a
practical reason for a right to bear arms: In a world in which the legal sys
tem was not to be trusted, perhaps the ability of the system's victims to resist
might convince the system to restrain itself.

States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm
themselves for self-defense.
Black Panther Part}'-Platform and Program, reprinted in REGINALD MAJOR A PANTHER Is A
�LACK CAT � 86 (1971). Yet, the Black Panthers deteriorated
into an ineffecti�e group of revolu·
·
t1onancs, at limes using arguably c nmma
· · ) means of euectuatmg
er
their agenda. See generally G ENE
MAR.INF., THE BLACK PANTHERS ( 1969); Boeey SEALE,
SEIZE THE TIME: THE STORY OF THE
Bl.ACK PANTH ER PARTY AND HUEY P. N EWTON
( 1 968).
274 JAMES FARMER, LAY BARE THE HEART: AN AUTOBIO
GRAPHY OF THE CIVIL RIG HTS
·
MOVEME NT 287 ( 1 985).
2 7 s . Set Bims, supra note 27 1 , at 26; see also Reed,
supra note 268 at 10
276 See Reed supra note 27 1 at 10; see also
Bims supra note 268 at 26
2 7 7· R AINES supra note 269, at 4 1 7 (intervie
w wit Charles R. Si s' lea
Dcacons) see B1 ms supra note 2 7 1
at 26; Reed, supra note 27 1 , at 1 Q. 1 1 .
278. FARM ER, supra note 274, at 288.
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CONCLUSION: SELF-DEFENSE AND THE GUN CONTROL QUESTION
TODAY

There are interesting parallels between the history of African-Americans
and discussion of the Second Amendment.

For most of this century, the

historiography of the black experience was at the periphery of the historical
profession's consciousness, an area of scholarly endeavor populated b y those
who were either ignored or regarded with suspicion by the mainstream of the
academy.279 Not until after World War II did the insights that could be
learned from the history of American race relations begin to have a major
influence on the works of constitutional policy makers in courts, legislatures,
and administrative bodies. Moreover, it should be stressed that, for a good
portion of the twentieth century, the courts found ways to ignore the consti
tutional demands imposed by the reconstruction amendments.280
While discussion o f the Second Amendment has been relegated t o the mar
gin of academic and judicial constitutional discourse, the realization that
there is a racial dimension to the question, and that the right may have had
greater and different significance for blacks and others less able to rely on the
government's protection, has been even further on the periphery. The his
tory of blacks and the right to bear arms, and the failure of most constitu
tional scholars and policymakers to seriously examine that history, is in part
another instance of the difficulty of integrating the study of the black experi
ence into larger questions of legal and social policy. 281
Throughout American history, black and white Americans have had radi
cally different experiences with respect to violence and state protection. Per
haps another reason the Second Amendment has not been taken very
seriously by the courts and the academy is that for many of those who shape
or critique constitutional policy, the state's power and inclination to protect
them is a given. But for all too many black Americans, that protection his
toricaHy has not been available. Nor, for many, is it readily available today.
If . in the past the state refused to protect black people from the horrors of

white lynch mobs, today the state seems powerless in the face of the tragic
black-on-black violence that plagues the mean streets of our inner cities, and

279. August Meir &

El liot

Rudwick, J. Franklin Jameson. Carter G. Woodson, and the Founda

tion of Black Historiography, 89 AM. HIST. R EV. 1005, 1005 ( 1 984).
280. See. e. g.. Schmidt, supra note 1 98, at 647 (describing the way in which the Supreme Court
failed to uphold the Fifteen t h Amendment in the late 1 9t h and early 20th centuries); see also Ran·
dall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of legal Academia.

1 02 HARV.

L.

REV. 1 745, 1 75 3 -54 ( 1 989)

(discussing the legal academia's w i l lingness to ignore the Reconstruction Amendments i n the early
20th century).
2 8 1 . One scholar has critic ized the failure of legal scholars with a left perspective "to incorporate
the authentic experience of minority communities in America."

Jose Bracamonte. Foreword to

Symposium, Minority Critiques of the Critical legal Studies Mol'f!mtnt. 22 HARV.
REV. 297, 298 ( 1 982).

C.R.-C. L. L.
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at times seems blind to instances of unnecessary police brutality visited upon
minority populations. 282
Admittedly, the racial atmosphere in this nation today is better than at any
time prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1 965. 283 It must also be
stressed, however, that many fear a decline in the quality of that atmosphere.
One cause for concern is the Supreme Court's assault in its 1 989 Term on
gains of the civil rights movement that had stood for decades. 284 Another is
the prominence of former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke, a member of
the Louisiana state legislature and a defeated, but nonetheless major, candi
date for the Senate in 1990. 2 8 5 In the last several years, two blacks who had
entered the "wrong" neighborhood in New York City have been
"lynched." 286 Is this a sign of more to come? The answer is not clear, but
the question is.
Twice in this nation's history-once following the Revolution, and again
after the Civil War-America has held out to blacks the promise of a nation
282. The beating of Rodney King on March 3, 199 1 , by members of the Los Angeles Police
Department, captured on tape by a serendipitous amateur photographer, has focused attention re
cently on the problem of police brutality, though the problem predates and presumably continues
beyond the incident. See Tracey Wood & Faye Fiore, Beating Victim Says He Obeyed Police, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at Al.
283. Pub. L . No. 89- 1 10, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended a t 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1 988)).
284. See. e.g.. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 ( 1 989) (urging, sua sponte, not
only reconsideration of Runyon v. Mccrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), on the issue of whether the right
to contract on a basis equal with whites under Civil Rights Act of 1 866 includes the right to be free
from discriminatory working conditions, but also overruling Runyon); Martin v. Wilkes, 490 U.S.
755 ( 1 989) (conferring on whites claiming reverse discrimination a continuing right to challenge
consent decrees involving affinnative action); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
( 1989) (essentially shifting the burden of proof in employment discrimination cases, such that an
employee must go beyond the showing of a disparate impact on a group protected by the statute;
also allowing an employer to establish a legitimate business justification as a defense, replacing the
standard established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 ( 1 97 1), which required an em
ployer to show that a discriminatory practice was indispensable or essential); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 ( 1 989) (subjecting remedial measures involving affirmative action to the
same standard of strict scrutiny as in cases of invidious racial discrimination).
285. See e.g. , Peter Applebome, Louisiana Tally is Seen as a Sign of Voter Unrest. N . Y . TIMES,
Oct. 8, 1 990, at A l ; David Maraniss, Duke Emerges from Loss Stronger Than Ever, WASH. PosT,
Oc1. 8, 1 990, at A l ; James M. Perry, Duke's Strong Run in Louisiana Sends National Politicians a
Shocking Message, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 9, 1990, at A5. Moreover, as of the time of final editing,
Duke had emerged from a field of four major candidates, including a member of Congress and the
mcumbcnt governor, to face a former governor in a runoff election. See Ex Klan Leader in Lo uisi
ana R unoff; Primary: David Duke Will Face Former Gov. Edwin Edwards, Who Led In Ballotting.
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 199 1 , at A l .
286. Michael Griffith, "a 23-year-old black man[,) was struck and
killed by a car on a Quee ns
.
highway
after being severely beaten twice by 9 to 12 white men who chased him and two othe r
black men through the streets of Howard Beach in what the
police called a racial attack." Robert
D. McFadden, Bl�ck an Dies After Beating by Whites in Queens
, N .Y . TIMES, Dec. 2 1 , 1 98 6, § I ,
at 1 Yusef Ha� u
l ns, (a] 16-year-old black youth[,) was shot to death . .
. in an attack by I 0 to 30
white teenage� m the Bcnsonh urst section of Brookly
n . . . . " Ralph Blumenthal, Black Yo uth is
Killed by Whites; Brook lyn Attack Is Called
Racial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1989, at A l .
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that would live up to its ideology of equality and of freedom. Twice the
nation has reneged o n that promise. The ending of separate but equal under
civil rights movement of the 1 960s, culmi
nating in the Civil Rights Act of 1 964, 2 8& the Voting Rights Act of 1 965 , 2 89

Brown

v.

Board in

1 954, 287-the

and the judicial triumphs of the 1960s and early 70s-all these have held out
to blacks in this century that same promise. Yet, given this history, it is not
unreasonable to fear that law, politics, and societal mores will swing the pen
dulum of social progress in a different direction, to the potential detriment of
blacks and their rights, property, and safety.
The history of blacks, firearms regulations, and the right to bear arms
should cause us to ask new questions regarding the Second Amendment.
These questions will pose problems both for advocates of stricter gun con
trols and for those who argue against them.

Much of the contemporary

crime that concerns Americans is in poor black neighborhoods290 and a case
can be made that greater firearms restrictions might alleviate this tragedy.
But another, perhaps stronger case can be made that a society with a dismal
record of protecting a people has a dubious claim on the right to disarm
them. Perhaps a re-examination of this history can lead us to a modern reali
zation of what the framers of the Second A mendment understood: that it is
unwise to place the means of protection totally in the hands of the state, and
that self-defense is also a civil right.

287. 347 U.S. 483 ( 1 954).
288. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 7 8 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 ( 1 9 8 8)).
289. Pub. L. No. 89- 1 10, 79 Stat 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1 973 ( 1 9 88)).
Race.
290. E.g SILBERMAN , sup ra note 1 99, at 1 60-6 1 ; Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp:
&
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A.
Howard
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1
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Dana A. Robinson, Black on Black Crime, SOCIETY, July/Aug . 1 988, at 5, 59.

